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Senseless Kindness: The Politics of CostBenefit Analysis
By Louis E. Wolcher*

Abstract
This essay dwells on a social phenomenon that the RussianJewish novelist and war correspondent Vasily Grossman calls
"senseless kindness."1 Emerging without prior warning from certain face-to-face encounters between human beings, the striking
reversal of preferences that characterizes this phenomenon can be
used to cast a critical light on the practices of Cost-Benefit Analysis ("CBA"). Not only does senseless kindness highlight the troubling theoretical problem of determining the "correct" ex ante-the
point in time at which CBA measures people's preferences-it also
suggests a more general critique of CBA's indifference to how preferences are formed and expressed. This essay shows that CBA ignores the concrete experiences of everyday human sociality and
communicative action by modeling them in all instances as "transaction costs" to be reduced or avoided rather than celebrated, or at
least studied for their meaning. Missing from CBA is any sense
that the face-to-face encounter between human beings is, or can
be, a moment of both individuation of the participants and transformation of their preferences, in which genuine freedom and politics, in the largest senses of these words, are first made possible.
Obsessed with what preferences are, CBA ignores the question of
how they emerge. The result is not just a partial and partisan
view of the possibilities for human decision making, but also a
technique that puts the validity of individual preferences beyond
all question and rational deliberation. Skeptical or afraid of government's ability to change culture, certain scientistically-minded
decision makers are happy to rely on a technique that purports
merely to reflect information about "what the people want." How* Charles I. Stone Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law,
William H. Gates Hall, Box 353020, Seattle, Washington 98195-3020, USA. E-mail
address: wolcher@u.washington.edu.
1. VASILY GROSSMAN, LIFE AND FATE 409 (Robert Chandler trans., Harper &
Row 1985) (1980).
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ever, CBA does not in fact mirror preferences as they are; instead,
it constructs them as they would be if the entire meaning and
value of human reason were reduced to purely instrumental
(means-ends) calculations on the basis of correct technique, and if
(per impossible) all context of people's concrete life histories were
somehow removed. Purporting to be a descriptive science of what
people just happen to prefer, CBA's theoretical model actually often produces a peculiarly asocial account of what their preferences
ought to be.
I. Knowledge and Opinion
Distilled to its essence, philosophy's most valuable contribution to social science is constantly to remind it that what is unquestioned is not necessarily unquestionable. In the West, this
passionate willingness to question began when the Greeks, from
whom we have inherited most of our philosophical and scientific
traditions, drew a fundamental distinction between knowledge
(epistimi) and opinion (doxa).2 The distinction was fundamental
for them because almost all Greek thinkers starting with Parmenides ranked theoretical knowledge of that which is (ousias, or
being) above the unquestioned and "obvious" truths of common
sense. 3 Classifying the attainment of pure knowledge and wisdom
(sophia) as an end in itself, they also ranked it above mere know4
how (phronisis).
Phronisisis practical and consists in the use of
instrumental reason as a means for achieving particular ends in
politics, material production, and daily life. While the Greeks did
not deny that phronisis possesses its own kind of truth-the kind
that pertains to effective action (praxis) in the sphere of production (techni)-they also believed that phronisis takes far too much
for granted about the world to be able to penetrate beneath the
outward appearance (eidos) of things and, in a moment of pure
viewing (theoria), reveal them as they really are. 5 Although doxa
is always content to take what "they" say about a thing for
granted, those who pursue the hard path of epistimi know that "a
thing's real constitution has a tendency to conceal itself."6 Hence
2. The meanings of, and interrelations among, the various Greek terms that
are mentioned in the text receive a much more detailed and subtle treatment in
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PLATO'S SOPHIST passim (Richard Rojcewicz & Andr6 Schuwer trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1997) (1992).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS 71 (T.M. Robinson trans., 1987).
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truth, for Greek philosophers, was not an idea or a statement in
accord with some already visible "fact"; rather, their word for
truth, alitheia, signifies un-concealment, 7 and therefore is tied to
the arduous effort of uncovering something in its truthsomething that would have remained hidden and obscure but for
8
the event of un-concealment.
These ancient distinctions cast an interesting light on the
modern social scientific practice of CBA.9 Standing on the theoria
side of the opposition between knowledge and opinion, CBA finds
itself in the unusual position of seeking theoretical knowledge
about mere opinions, as opposed to theoretical knowledge about
some underlying reality or truth that commonsensical attitudes
may have distorted. As the Greeks would have said, probably with
a certain degree of contempt, CBA seeks epistimi about doxa:
that is, it acquires theoretical knowledge concerning human opinions-in the form of individual preferences-most of which are
themselves pre- or un-theoretical. What is more, CBA is a positive
social science in the modern sense of the word-that is, a factoriented technique for producing useful results-and therefore is
generally disinclined to question its own grounds. 10 For example,
although it is well known that a person's revealed preferences are
in part a function of her existing level of wealth," CBA accepts the
existing legal distribution of entitlements in society as a pre-given
"fact."1 2 Given CBA's uncritical attitude about questions of distributive justice, the legitimacy of its policy or welfare recommendations necessarily depends on the unquestioned legitimacy of the
particular property rights that underlie the relevant supply and

7. For a general discussion of the relationship between the Greek notion of
truth (alitheia)and its subsequent Latin incarnation as veritas, which ultimately
came to signify mere "correctness," see MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BASIC QUESTIONS OF
PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED "PROBLEMS" OF "LOGIC" 95-108 (Richard Rojcewicz &

Andr6 Schuwer trans., Ind.Univ. Press 1994) (1984).
8. See id. at 88-93.
9. See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 9-24 (2006) (explaining the theoretical basis for CBA).
10. Cf. RICHARD ZERBE, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 16

(2001) (arguing that CBA should provide useful information and be widely accepted, and that the rule chosen through CBA should be superior to all other rules).
11. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 9 at 130-31 (noting that textbook CBA
does not adjust for preference distortions caused by wealth).
12. See Paul Heyne, The Foundations of Law and Economics: Can the Blind
Lead the Blind?, 11 RES. L. & ECON. 53, 56 (1988) ("Economic theory takes for
granted, far more extensively than economists seem generally to recognize, the
normative force of established rights and obligations."). See also ZERBE, supra note
10, at 27.
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demand functions, 13 and that co-determine the "psychological ref14
erence point" for people's subjective beliefs about ownership.
Putting all questions of legitimacy aside for the moment, it
must also be said that CBA shows little, if any, intellectual interest in the question of why people have the preferences they have,
or why their willingness to pay ("WTP") to achieve gains and their
willingness to accept ("WTA") to compensate for losses are what
they are at any given point in time. It is true, of course, that rational choice theory has always been aware, at least at some level
of consciousness, that people's preferences are affected by the opportunities afforded them by their individual experiences and by
prevailing social and institutional arrangements-in short, by history in the largest sense of the word. 15 From the small (what we
eat and wear) to the large (our various political and cultural institutions), different epochs and cultures produce different "opportunity sets" from which individuals are required to choose.' 6 Given
this existential truth, a few rational choice theorists have called
for CBA to take the "why"-question more seriously, perhaps by
making it into an object of analysis, or, better still, a formal variable in the theory. Robert Higgs, for example, alleges that rational choice theory ought to take account of the powerful influence of ideology on preference formation, 17 while Michael Hechter
observes (and bemoans) economists' relatively low level of theoretical sophistication about what he calls the "micro-macro link"
connecting individual preferences to their social conditions.' 8 Despite these and other calls for CBA to broaden its scope of inquiry,
however, its mainstream practitioners by and large remain uninterested in the question of why people have the preferences they
have; indeed, some of these practitioners even go so far as to display their indifference in this respect as if it were an intellectual

13. Heyne, supra note 12, at 53-71.
14. See ZERBE, supra note 10, at 83 (discussing the psychological reference
point).
15. See generally Peter Abell, Sociological Theory and Rational Choice Theory,
in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL THEORY 223, 223-44 (Bryan S. Turner

ed., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing rational choice theory and preference formation).
16. See Nicolas Gravel, Can a Ranking of Opportunity Sets Attach an Intrinsic
Importance to Freedom of Choice?, AM. ECON. REV., May 1994, at 454 (defining "opportunity sets").
17. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 35-56 (1987).

18. See Michael Hechter, The Micro-Macro Link in Rational Choice Theory,
PERSP.: THEORY SECTION NEWSL. (AM. SOC. ASS'N), July 1992, at 1, 1-2.
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badge of honor.' 9 For CBA, it is enough that people simply appear
with measurable WTPs and WTAs that can be summed up and
then brought into a quantitative relationship that determines
whether a given project is or is not efficient.
In thinking about CBA's theoretical and practical indifference to "Why?," it is important to remember that this question,
though exceedingly common in everyday speech, is nonetheless
ambiguous in the present context. The question "Why?" can seek
factual information about the causes and conditions of a preference, or it can inquire after the preference's grounds. The first
kind of inquiry aims at a historical explanation; the second seeks a
normative reason or justification. To illustrate: a person who says
she wants to keep the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge ("ANWR")
free from all oil exploration may explain her preference by appealing to the fact that her parents raised her to love nature (a causal
answer to "Why?") or by saying that drilling in ANWR is the environmentally and morally wrong thing to do (a normative answer to
"Why?"). Although CBA's indifference to the purely historical explanation of preferences can perhaps be defended on the basis of
an academic division of labor that assigns causal questions to disciplines like history, sociology, and psychology, reserving so-called
"economic" and "policymaking' questions to CBA, the roots of its
indifference to the normative grounds of preferences lie much
deeper. Whether consciously or unconsciously, CBA, like many
modern social scientific disciplines, has wholeheartedly appropriated Max Weber's central thesis that the environing world-the
human world in both its natural and social dimensions-has be20
come disenchanted.
Beginning with the Enlightenment, human reason in the
form of science and technology has been achieving an everincreasing mastery of natural and social processes. 21 And while
this mastery has delivered many material benefits to human be23
22
ings, it is also true, as Western thinkers from Plato to Weber
19. See, e.g., Heyne, supra note 12, at 57 ("It is quite true that economists take
the existing system for granted in their work; it would make no sense to do anything else.").
20. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 506 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968).
21. See generally M.J. Inwood, Enlightenment, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY 236, 236-37 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995) (describing the Enlightenment
and criticism of its doctrines).
22. PLATO, Charmides, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 99, 119 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
23. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
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have rightly reminded us, that science as such can give no answer
to the question of how we should live or what we should do. Moreover, one need not be a Luddite to notice that there can be troubling byproducts of scientific and technological mastery, including
especially losses at the emotional and psychological level. For by
gradually dissolving the irrational elements and effects of superstitions, prejudices, errors, and religious orthodoxies in society, instrumental reason has also undermined people's faith that there is
a stable and agreed-upon ultimate meaning of the world. 24 To put
this in terms that are familiar to CBA, there are important existential costs that people might have been willing to pay to avoidand that many indeed did pay to avoid, both in treasure and in
blood-on account of the very historical changes that made the
25
discipline of CBA imaginable in the first place.
An ultimate meaning is not the same as an end in the sense
of the means-ends relationship: ends are what means aim at,
whereas meaning shows itself within the very historical process of
using means to accomplish ends. For example, the relentless pursuit of consumer goods by earning as much money as possible to
pay for them can be explained as the rational use of means to accomplish material ends, but the ultimate meaning of consumerism
as a way of life cannot be so easily explained. 26 In short, our gain
of technological control over the world (as a means) has produced
the loss of any stable sense that the world (as an end) possesses a
universal rational meaning. The converse is also true, of course,
since experience teaches that the scientific spirit's degree of vigor
is inversely proportional to the number of sacred cows that stand
in its way. While the empirical result of this dialectical process of
SOCIOLOGY 129, 143 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).

24. See id. at 142 ("If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they
are apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as 'meaning' of the universe die
out at its very roots.").
25. See, e.g., William Bradford, Beyond Reparations:An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-51 (2005) (describing "brutal reality of invasion,
slavery, forced relocation, genocide, land theft, ethnocide, and forcible denial of the
right to self-determination" that defines the United States' historical treatment of
American Indians); see also id. at 20 n.104 (citing the United States Supreme
Court's discussion in Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877), that American
Indians, "largely influenced by superstition and fetishism, ... are essentially a
simple, uninformed, and inferior people .... [A]s a superior and civilized nation
[the United States has] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and
protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders.").
26. This is more or less what Heidegger meant when he declared that "the essence of technology is nothing technological." MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question
Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER

ESSAYS 3, 35 (William Lovitt trans., 1977).
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gain and loss is a formally rationalized social system-one that
maximizes the ability of individuals to calculate the consequences
of their actions-the resulting content of social life can nonetheless be seen as substantively irrational from the standpoint of ultimate values such as brotherliness, social justice, or even the attainment of individual happiness.2 7 Weber's metaphor of the "iron
cage" of rationality shows that a social system can become instrumentally rational to the highest degree without necessarily affording the people within it the chance to imagine and pursue a substantively rational way of life. 28 Witness the familiar phenomena
in fully industrialized societies such as the United States and Japan of "living to work" (instead of the other way around), "the rat
race," and the consumerist imperative of "keeping up with the
29
Joneses."
Thus it has come to pass that post-Enlightenment world his3
tory, in the form of what Nietzsche calls the "advent of nihilism,"
has brought forth a scientific discipline, CBA, that interprets the
world as a kind of warehouse or store that is full of material fit
only for the purposive, rational pursuit of individual interests,
whatever they may be.
CBA is nihilistic in the precise
Nietzschean sense that its highest value-respect for individual
choices-has devalued itself by removing any objective criterion of
the rightness or reasonableness of choices. 3 1 According to Weber,
the rationality that predominates in, and even defines, modernity
is an instrumental, or means-end, kind of rationality (Zweckrationalitdt).32 Instrumental reason is purposive: it aims to harness
the object world and other human beings in the service of particular interests. In place of a universal morality predicated on tradition-based consensus, social life thus shows itself to CBA as a plu27. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE
SOCIAL AND MORAL THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 61-87 (Routledge 1991) (1984).
28. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 123-25

(Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge Classics 2001) (1930). We actually owe the
phrase "iron cage" to Talcott Parsons, who translated Weber's German expression,
ein stahihartes Gehduse. The expression can also be translated as "a casing, or
housing, as hard as steel."

DEREK SAYER, CAPITALISM AND MODERNITY: AN

ExcuRSuS ON MARX AND WEBER 144 (1991).

29. See Paul Krugman, Money Can't Buy Happiness. Er, Can It?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1999, at A23; James Sterngold, Life in a Box: Japanese Question Fruits of
Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, at Al.
30. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 3 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Wal-

ter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Random House 1967) (1901).
31. Id. at 9 (defining nihilism in terms of a society's ultimate values devaluing
themselves).
32. BRUBAKER, supra note 27, at 51-53.
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rality of competing "values" encoded in "interests."
From the standpoint of the neo-Kantian metaphysics of subjectivity that explicitly informs Weberian thought and implicitly
33
informs CBA, values cannot be rationally grounded, only chosen.
CBA performs the alchemy of transforming these admittedly incommensurable values into commensurable preferences only by
counting people's ability to back their values up with cash in the
form of WTPs and WTAs.3 4 But of course the result of a purely arithmetical balance between cash bids and counter-bids cannot
make a project right or reasonable if the individual values that
motivate the bids are themselves immune to all rational criticism.
If it is true that some CBA practitioners personally prefer a politics that is committed to creating ever greater individual "freedom" in the world, then it is also true that CBA itself gives them
no criterion to distinguish between mindless licentiousness and
the rational exercise of freedom. The dominant tradition of political liberalism defines freedom negatively, as the mere absence of
certain government constraints on choice.3 5 If one is "free" by this
definition, how is one supposed to rationally choose one's values in
a disenchanted world, a world in which all traditional modes of
grounding values have lost their binding force? This is a question
that CBA does not and will not answer. Although someone like
Kant might define genuine freedom as self-legislation according to
the universal moral law within,36 in today's completely disenchanted age there are many competing and plausible claims about
what the moral law is and what it requires.3 7 It would therefore
seem that CBA cannot espouse Kant's or anyone else's positive
definition of freedom without running the risk of losing its "objectivity," and thereby becoming political instead of scientific.

33. I am referring to so-called 'Marburg neo-Kantianism," according to which
science, ethics, and law are said to exist solely as cultural products, and instead of
there being a thing-in-itself there exist only competing constructions of the world.
See Lewis Beck, Neo-Kantianism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, su-

pra note 21, at 611, 611-12.
34. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND

PRACTICE 33-36 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the theoretical limitations of using WTP
as the basis for social ordering).
35. See Louis E. Wolcher, The Paradox of Remedies: The Case of International
Human Rights Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 555 (2000).
36. See IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF

KANT 154 (Carl Friedrich ed., 1993).
37. See generally Nicholas Dent, Moral Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 586, 586; Richard Norman, History of Moral Philosophy, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra,at 586, 586-91.
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When it still thought of itself as political economy, 38 the discipline of economics actually cared about the problem of how the
economic system (the material reproduction of society) affects and
interacts with the various normative systems that integrate individuals into the social order (the symbolic reproduction of society).
For instance, the late John Kenneth Galbraith, who made a point
of describing himself as a political economist, once quoted with
approval a colleague's opinion that the "the economist, like every39
one else, must concern himself with the ultimate aims of man."
But today, as Jilrgen Habermas has noted, economics as a specialized science has broken off the relation between material reproduction and symbolic reproduction and has absolved itself of any
questions about the legitimacy of the social order, including its
possible pathologies. 40 Today's economists construe rationality in
purely functional terms-as a means to economic equilibrium and
rational choice-and economics as a discipline loses its historical
connection to the rational study and evaluation of the sociopolitical structures within which all equilibriums and choice occur.
In particular, CBA becomes a kind of semi-autonomous administrative system, and its connection to the life-world is maintained
at only one discrete point: the point at which CBA intervenes to
measure preferences. The forces that shape preferences go unexamined, with the result that CBA can contribute nothing to the
study and development of the public sphere where preferences are
continuously being formed and reformed within the "Bacchanalian
41
whirl" of their sheer becoming-in-time.
It is therefore unsurprising that CBA fails to address the
question of whether individual preferences are well-grounded in
ethics, morality, or some other normative system: as an empirical
social science, CBA is configured in such a way that it lacks any
mechanism for adjudicating the validity of people's preferences.
One might even go so far as to say that the very existence of CBA
as a well-respected discipline tends to prove Nietzsche's thesis
38. Weber, for example, styled himself a "political economist." WEBER, supra
note 23, at 129.
39. John Kenneth Galbraith,THE NATION, May 22, 2006, at 4-5.
40. 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 4 (Thomas

McCarthy trans., 1984).
41. GEORG

WILHELM

FRIEDRICH

HEGEL,

HEGEL'S

PREFACE

TO

THE

PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 153 (Yirmiyahu Yovel trans., Princeton Univ. Press
2005) (1807) ("Appearance [the phenomenon] is the generation and passing away
which itself is neither generated nor passes away, but is in itself and constitutes
the actuality of truth and the movement of its life. The true is thus the Bacchanalian whirl....").
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that in today's world "the highest values devaluate themselves.
The aim is lacking; 'why?' finds no answer." 42 Instead of why, we
find the mere what of WTPs and WTAs-entities crafted in advance as pristine numerical quantities supremely suited for the
task of scientific management and control. Habermas describes
the situation of CBA perfectly when he says that "the situation to
be regulated [or analyzed], which is embedded in the context of a
life-history and a concrete form of life, has to be subjected to violent abstraction, not only because it has to be subsumed under a
43
law but also in order that it can be dealt with administratively."
The radical abstraction of reality that is performed by modern social science, including especially CBA, underscores the fact that
there is an intimate connection between CBA's methods and
purely administrative modes of decision making. Once its numerical data on preferences is collected, CBA's calculations lead directly to administration, bypassing the processes that are constantly socializing and individuating the people whose lives will be
affected by the decisions that administration makes. Perhaps this
explains why certain CBA practitioners admit that their criterion
of economic efficiency "does not tell us 'the right thing to do' in a
transcendent moral or spiritual sense." 44 Implicit in this way of
thinking about values is a contestable, albeit historically understandable, view about the nature of morality: namely, that moral
actions are always deduced once and for all by individuals from
personally chosen criteria that are immune both to rational criticism and to the messy historical processes in which individual
preferences-including moral preferences-are formed and expressed.
II. Why and How
Although CBA's indifference to the question "Why?" in both
its causal and normative senses is understandable, given CBA's
history, the same cannot be said about its equally profound indifference to the question of how preferences are formed. The questions "Why?" and "How?" do not seek the same kind of knowledge.
Why a thing is pertains to its antecedents or its grounds-its historical causes or normative reasons-but how a thing is always codetermines what it is. The causal why of a thing is usually inves-

42. NIETZSCHE, supra note 30, at 9.
43. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 40, at xxxiv.
44. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 29.
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tigated by those who are concerned with general laws of human
action and the useful explanations they afford, whereas the normative why is usually investigated by those who care about its legitimacy. In contrast, determining the unified what and how of a
thing requires ontological investigation and aims toward a description rather than an explanation or a justification. That these
different ways of making sense of the world sometimes find themselves in tension, or even at cross-purposes, is indicated by a remark of Wittgenstein's: "People who are constantly asking 'why'
are like tourists who stand in front of a building reading Baedeker
and are so busy reading the history of its construction, etc., that
they are prevented from seeing the building."45 Putting why aside
for a moment, one could say that what and how are opposite sides
of the same coin. To borrow a distinction from the medieval Scholastics, the what-being (essentia)of an individual preference is its
determination as a present entity possessing certain attributes,
whereas its how-being (existentia)consists in its having a certain
mode of existence-a manner or style of persisting, and perhaps
46 .
changing, through time.
It is tempting to think that CBA is a perfect example of what
Edmund Husserl describes as "the positivistic reduction of the
idea of science to mere factual science"-the kind of science that
turns away from the enigma of subjectivity to mere calculation
47
based on what is taken for granted about individual preferences.
Despite Husserl's unflattering hypothesis that "merely factminded sciences make for merely fact-minded people," 48 one would
like to think that the formation and expression of preferences as
lived phenomena would be of great interest to CBA, especially if it
could be demonstrated that the scientific truth of a preference's
what-being cannot be thought independently of its how-being. To
borrow one of the earlier-noted distinctions drawn by the Greeks,
the difficult task of un-concealing knowledge (epistime) about the
nature of preferences is not the same as taking one's unreflective

45. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 40e (G.H. Von Wright ed.,
Peter Winch trans., Basil Blackwell Oxford 1980) (1977).
46. On the distinction between essentia and existentia, see MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC 177-178 (Michael Heim trans., Ind.
Univ. Press 1984) (1978).
47. EDMUND HUSSERL,
THE CRISIS OF
EUROPEAN
SCIENCES AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 5-7 (David Carr trans., Nw. Univ. Press 1970)
(1954).
48. Id. at 6.
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opinion (doxa) about preferences for granted. 49 And indeed it is
true: the proposition that the what and the how of preferences are
inextricably linked has been demonstrated by behavioral econo50
mists.
Once considered marginal and exotic by mainstream economists, the academic discipline of behavioral economics has shown
experimentally that phenomena such as "framing" can vitally affect the outcomes that people choose, even when all available
choices are mathematically equivalent. For example, in an important 1981 paper, Tversky and Kahneman described an experiment
with subjects who were presented with a hypothetical scenario in
which the United States is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual disease that is expected to kill 600 people. 51 First asked to
choose between Program A that would save a projected 200 people
and Program B that carries a one-third probability that 600 people
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no one will be
saved, 72% of the subjects in the experiment chose Program A,
even though the expected outcomes of the two programs are identical. 52 Then the experimenters restated the problem, presenting
subjects with a choice between Program C, in which 400 people
will die, and Program D, in which there is a one-third probability
that no one will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 will
die.53 This time 78% chose Program D, despite the fact that it is
mathematically equivalent to Program C. 54 The difference between the two experiments consists solely in the manner in which
55
the choices were expressed: lives "saved" versus lives "lost." It
appears that people are risk-averse when it comes to saving lives,
but risk takers when it comes to lives being lost, despite the fact
that "saving" and "losing" are strictly correlative terms in the
overall context of the two opportunity sets. The paper thus provides a classic example of what the authors aptly call a "framing
56
effect" within the phenomenon of choice.
Experiments like this show that by manipulating the environment in which preferences are expressed-that is, manipulat49. See supra notes 2-8.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 51-56.
51. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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ing the how of preference formation-behavioral economists can
observe measurable differences in what those preferences are.
While the insight of behavioral economists into the constitutive relation between how and what is unquestionably an improvement
over the aprioristic deduction of preferences from a purely mathematical model of rational choice, behavioral economics is still at
bottom a causal science. That is, it conceives of social mechanisms
such as framing as mere variables that produce measurable outcomes in people's choices. It subordinates or ignores what goes on
as preferences are formed in order to determine what the preferences ultimately "are" in relation to the different modes of framing
that precede them. In other words, what goes on while people are
forming their preferences in an experiment such as Tversky's and
Kahneman's is of interest to behavioral economics only insofar as
it can be correlated with a difference in the outcomes people
choose. That the event of preference-formation as such might be
worthy of investigation does not occur to behavioral economists
any more than it does to the practitioners of CBA.
Thus, behavioral economics remains just as indifferent as
CBA is to the phenomenological dimension of human preferences:
their how as seen from within, namely, as lived phenomena. At
one level this is understandable: no science can proceed without
constructing its objects in a manner that allows them to be measured. But when one considers that CBA's entire raison d'tre is to
assist government in deciding whether and how to proceed with
projects that will affect people's lives for better or worse, then the
directly political application of CBA makes its methodological decisions all the more significant.5 7 I will argue in what follows that
by recognizing preferences only insofar as they fit into preestablished functional units that are fit for measurement, CBA
creates a kind of bureaucratic blindness to the spontaneous processes of opinion- and will-formation. And this blindness, in turn,
makes it easier for decision makers to decouple their political decisions from the concrete, identity-forming contexts in which people's preferences actually arise, as well as to avoid investing in
public institutions that would make widespread popular deliberation and discussion of competing political preferences possible.

57. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION ix (2002).
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III. Senseless Kindness
This essay's primary goal is to bring the phenomenological
dimension of preference formation and expression to light as part
of a critical assessment of CBA's purely theoretical structure.
Since this leads inevitably to a demonstration of CBA's ideological
effects, I will leave for another day the difficult question of
whether and how CBA's model can be applied in the real world to
yield information about preferences that could reasonably be
called reliable by CBA's own criteria. Economists are able to
measure revealed preferences because WTPs and WTAs appear in
observable market transactions where people put their money
where their mouths are, so to speak. But CBA considers itself
relevant to government decision making precisely because the
market has not provided a solution to the problems of public policy
that it analyzes. The difficult task of developing a method for researching people's WTPs and WTAs in the absence of actual
transactions where all relevant preferences are revealed thus becomes particularly important for CBA. Nevertheless, in this essay
I will bracket and ignore this problem of application, not because I
think it is uninteresting, but because I want to focus on CBA's
theoretical model itself, as that model stands in relation both to
what it purports to model and to its implications for the possibility
of a genuinely democratic form of politics.
The term "senseless kindness" in this essay's title comes from
a scene in Life and Fate, an epic novel about Stalinist repression
and the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second
World War. 58 Its author, Vasily Grossman, was a Russian-Jewish

novelist and war correspondent for Krasnaya Zvezda, or Red Star,
the official newspaper of the Red Army. 59 Although the manuscript was actively suppressed by the authorities, 60 Vladimir
Voinovich, one of the principal Soviet dissidents of the mid-1970s,
managed to smuggle a microfilm copy abroad, 61 and the novel was
eventually published in 1980, sixteen years after the author's
death. 62 The recent discovery and publication of Grossman's war58. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 409.
59. VASILY GROSSMAN, A WRITER AT WAR: VASILY GROSSMAN WITH THE RED

ARMY 1941-45, at vii (Anthony Beevor & Luba Vinogradova eds. & trans., 2005).
60. After the KGB seized what it thought were all existing copies of the manuscript, a Communist Party official told Grossman that there could be no question of
Life and Fate being published for another 200 years. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at
9.
61. Id. at 15.
62. Id. at 10.
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time notebooks has made it clear that many, if not most, of the
war scenes in the novel are based on actual incidents that
63
Grossman heard about or observed as a correspondent.
Grossman was embedded with Soviet forces as they retreated in
panic following Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June of
1941,64 as they fought from near-disaster to victory during the
nightmarish battle of Stalingrad in 1942-43,65 and as the Red
Army made its slow but relentless advance from central Russia all
the way to Berlin and the end of the war in May of 1945.66
The phrase "senseless kindness" appears in the context of
Grossman's description of a punitive action aimed at a Russian village by a German military unit bent on "exact[ing] vengeance for
the murder of two soldiers." 67 An Aktion like countless others perpetrated throughout the Soviet Union by the S.S. and the
Wehrmacht, this particular event contains a small but striking detail that underscores the bewildering complexity of human nature.68 The operation began late in the afternoon. 69 The Germans
entered the village, ordered its women to dig a large pit at the
edge of the forest, and rounded up and held twenty male peasants
for execution at daybreak the following morning. 70 One of the
women whose husband had been seized was also forced to quarter
several German soldiers overnight in her hut. 71 The next morning, as the Germans were checking their machine-guns, the eldest
of them somehow pulled his trigger by mistake and shot himself in
the stomach. 72 His compatriots bandaged his wound as best they
could, laid him on a cot in the woman's hut, and went outside to
begin shooting the captives. 73 They left the woman alone in
charge of the wounded soldier and motioned for her to watch over
him. 74 Grossman describes what happened next:
63. GROSSMAN, supra note 59, at xvii.
64. Id. at xi.
65. Id. at xiv.
66. Id. at xvii. See also Verlyn Klinkenborg, Westward into War with the Soviet
Novelist and Reporter Vasily Grossman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A28 ('What
the war gave Grossman were the materials and the mind to write 'Life and Fate,'
arguably the greatest Russian novel of the 20th century.").
67. GROSSMAN, supranote 1, at 408-409.
68. See id. at 408.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The woman thought to herself how simple it would be to
strangle him. There he was, muttering away, his eyes closed,
weeping, sucking his lips.... Suddenly he opened his eyes and
said in very clear Russian: 'Water, Mother.' 'Damn you,' said
the woman. 'What I should do is strangle you.' Instead she
gave him some water. He grabbed her by the hand and signed
to her to help him sit up: he couldn't breathe because of the
bleeding. She pulled him up and he clasped his arms round
her neck. Suddenly there was a volley of shots outside and the
woman began to tremble. Afterwards she told people what she
had done. No one could understand; nor could she explain it
herself. This senseless kindness is condemned in the fable
about the pilgrim who warmed a snake in his bosom. It is the
kindness that has mercy on a tarantula that has bitten a
child. A mad, blind kindness. People enjoy looking in stories
and fables for examples of the danger of this senseless kindness. But one shouldn't be afraid of it. One might just as well
be afraid of a freshwater fish carried out by chance into the
salty ocean. The harm from time to time occasioned a society,
class, race or State by this senseless kindness fades away in
the light that emanates from those who are endowed with it.
This kindness, this stupid kindness, is what is most truly human in a human being. It is what sets man apart, 75
the highest
achievement of his soul. No, it says, life is not evil!
Many other gratuitous and unforeseen acts of kindness appear in this book, and, in a good illustration of form following content, they seem to occur almost randomly during the course of the
narrative. To mention but one other example, there is a scene in
which a captured German officer and his men are removing decomposing bodies from a basement in Stalingrad at the end of the
battle in the winter of 1943.76 A woman in a crowd of Russian
onlookers takes great delight in witnessing the obvious misery and
suffering of the Germans, who have been forced by Russian troops
to perform this heinous task.7 7 At one point the Germans bring
out the corpse of an adolescent girl on a stretcher, and the woman
collapses and wails in grief when she sees that it is the body of her
daughter.7 8 Getting to her feet, the woman begins to stride angrily
79
toward the captive officer, and a Russian guard lets her pass.
Sensing that she is about to take vengeance, the crowd cannot
take their eyes off her.8 0 The narrative continues:

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 408-09.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 805.
Id.
Id.
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The woman could no longer see anything at all except the face
of the German with the handkerchief round his mouth. Not
understanding what was happening to her, governed by a
power she had just now seemed to control, she felt in the
pocket of her jacket for a piece of bread that had been given to
her the evening before by a soldier. She held it out to the
German officer and said: 'There, have something to eat.' Afterwards, she was unable to 8understand what had happened
to her, why she had done this. 1
Much later still, lying on her bed, the woman remembered what
she had done outside the cellar in Stalingrad, and she thought to
82
herself, "'I was a fool then, and I'm still a fool now."'
The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas was greatly impressed
with Life and Fate, and not just because of its plot or its excellent
writing.8 3 He was affected most of all by the many scenes and stories in the book depicting unaccountable acts of kindness passing
from one person to another, most of which were performed under
circumstances in which one might expect the twin impulses of selfregard and self-preservation to be at their strongest.8 4 Indeed,
Levinas went so far as to interpret the novel as a quasiphilosophical text full of meaning about the essential nature of
human goodness. 8 5 To distill a rich and variegated body of philosophical work to its essence, Levinas (and probably Grossman, too)
believed that human goodness as such cannot be reduced to or explained by a person's compliance with ethical or legal norms, nor
can it be equated with an individual "preference" for goodness that
could be quantified and compared with other individual preferences according to some sort of politico-scientific calculus. 86 As I
have said elsewhere, Levinas fixates on "the phenomenal irrationality of the ubiquitous small kindnesses that pass between strangers before reason has 'explained' them by reducing them to calcu87
lations based on short- or long-term reciprocity."
The difficulty of understanding these small kindnesses lies
much deeper than the familiar question of whether it is legitimate
for economists to make interpersonal comparisons of utility by

81. Id. at 805-06.
82. Id. at 806.
83. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, IS IT RIGHTEOUS TO BE?: INTERVIEWS WITH EMMANUEL

LEVINAS 80 (Jill Robbins ed., 2001).
84. Id. at 81.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Louis E. WOLCHER, BEYOND TRANSCENDENCE IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 142

(2005).
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transforming ordinal values into cardinal ones.88 Rather, the real
difficulty posed by the phenomenon of senseless kindness has to do
with the very possibility of rational explanation itself: if human
kindness arises from the particularities of each case rather than
from the generality of a norm or preference that aspires to control
or at least explain all of the cases that fall under it, then it follows
that the faculty of reason can neither control nor properly account
for primordial kindness as a phenomenon. Senseless kindness
reminds us of the fundamental uncertainty of human action; it
tends to confirm Hannah Arendt's observation "that we never
quite know what we are doing when we begin to act into the web of
interrelationships and mutual dependencies that constitute the
field of action."89 Despite, or perhaps because of, the ubiquity of
this kind of uncertainty, responsible decision-oriented technologies
such as CBA are always seeking to achieve the most efficient
technical solution to difficult social problems. As a result, such
technologies by their very nature cannot see the point or value of
studying any human behaviors that do not generate "data" that
might contribute to a definitive solution. From this point of view,
if the possibility of an unintended negative consequence can be
foreseen, then its value can be calculated and incorporated into
the analysis. And if it cannot be foreseen, well, then the most that
one can do is gamely follow the advice in one of Wittgenstein's
pithiest aphorisms: "What the eye doesn't see the heart doesn't
grieve over." 90
Richard Zerbe has expressed CBA's attitude toward any information that does not contribute to an efficient public policy solution by putting what is at stake in terms of a kind of competition
between different methods of decision making: "If the government
uses [the] KH or KHZ [criteria of efficiency] for evaluating all of its
decisions instead of using some other criteria[,] it has the best
88. In the present context, "ordinal" means a definite ranking of goods (1st,
2nd, 3rd, etc.) within a set of available goods whose order is determined by a single
actor's particular utility function. "Cardinal" refers to an absolute ranking of goods
(1, 2, 3, etc.) on the basis of some criterion other than a particular actor's utility
function. Thus, the proposition "If they all cost the same, A prefers ice cream to
broccoli, and broccoli to gruel" expresses something about A's ordinal utility,
whereas "Ice cream is better than broccoli, and broccoli is better than gruel" is a
proposition of cardinal utility that purports to be valid for all actors.
89. HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE OF POLITICS 56 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2005)

(noting that this uncertainty "was considered by ancient philosophy to be the one
supreme argument against the seriousness of human affairs").
90. LUDWIG WITTIGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS

101e (G.H. Von Wright et al. eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., M.I.T. Press 1967)
(1956).
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chance of making all of the people in a society better off 'at the end
of the day."' 91 However honestly and fervently held this opinion
may be, its very mode of expression confirms Bernard Stiegler's
description of the modern "technocratic state"-a state that "no
longer has as its aim either the encouragement of communicative
action or the achievement of a critical distance toward purposiverational action."92 Instead, the technocratic state's "activity consists in finding solutions to questions of a technical nature, those
that escape public discussion." 93 By characterizing policymaking
as a purely technical problem, thinkers such as Zerbe overlook the
possibility that other "methods" of policymaking might actually be
ends rather than means-that they might express the kind of rationality that Weber calls Wertrationalitit:behavior that is believed to possess intrinsic value or inherent rightness, even if it
does not lead to policy outcomes that are efficient when measured
by the sum of people's pre-behavior preferences. 94 In short, CBA
fails to consider the possibility that the coming-and-being-together
of political discussion and mutual learning about a policy problem
might be part of the good life itself, if not also a catalyst that can
reshape the terms of the problem and people's feelings about it.
Zerbe's remark shows that CBA instead conceives of decision making methods in terms of costs that regrettably must be borne in
the pursuit of solutions to problems the contents of which remain
unaffected by the way in which they are decided.
Likewise, defining policymaking solely in terms of competing
methods for making the mass of people in general better off in the
future cannot explain a fact that is well known to any law professor who has ever tried, to teach the insights of law and economics
in the classroom: namely, that many law students seem viscerally
averse to reducing problems of decision making-legal or otherwise-to the ex ante calculation of costs and benefits according to
the criterion of efficiency. 95 What can or should CBA do with a
preference to avoid CBA itself in favor of, say, deontological modes

91. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 28. The particular criteria animating the forms of
efficiency that are mentioned in text will be discussed later.
92. BERNARD STIEGLER, TECHNICS AND TIME, 1,at 12 (Richard Beardsworth &
George Collins trans., Stan. Univ. Press 1998) (1994).
93. Id.
94. BRUBAKER, supra note 27, at 51-53.
95. Here I can cite only a quarter-century of my own experience in teaching
contracts and torts to first-year law students, as well as hearsay evidence about
colleagues witnessing the same kind of reluctance in their students.
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of decision making such as Kant's Categorical Imperative, 96 or
even just asking decision makers to obey the ancient maxim fiat
justitia pereat mundis? 97 As Lon Fuller's well-developed procedural theory of natural law shows, people can have moral preferences for the way decisions are made that are at least as strong as
their preferences for the contents of those decisions. 98 And since
there is no reason in principle why CBA ought not apply to procedures as well as to substance, the worrying possibility that this
presents for the continued existence of CBA as a discipline is obvious. This possibility can be metaphorically illustrated by the tale
of the Cheshire Cat in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: this remarkable cat proceeded to vanish, bit by bit, in response to Alice's
persistent questioning, leaving only a faint grin to bear witness to
the fact that it had ever existed at all. 99 To put the matter at
stake more directly, and in CBA's own terms: if the preference for
exclusively deontological modes of decision making and against
teleological methods such as CBA is or becomes sufficiently widespread in society, and if the preference is backed up by a large
enough aggregate WTP, then it would seem to follow from CBA's
own methods and criteria that it ought to willingly choose to go
out of business, or at least to cease offering any more policy advice
to government decision makers.
Levinas astutely observes that the numerous acts of senseless kindness described in Life and Fate do not call for any political action, just as they do not preach anything that could be called
an ethical doctrine. 10 0 On the contrary, "the scenes of goodness in
an inhuman world are disseminated throughout the book, without
transforming it into a virtuous book for virtuous readers." 10 1 The
many simple acts of kindness that appear in the course of the
novel are "exterior to all system," Levinas claims, and they leave
the mind to grasp a kind of "ethics without ethical system" in
which "the only thing that remains is individual goodness, from

96. Kant eschewed all forms of consequentialism in matters of ethics in favor of
a mode of decision making that focuses on the intrinsic rightness of the action that
is willed. See KANT, supra note 36, at 155 ("A good will is good not because of what
it performs or effects, nor by its aptness for attaining some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition.").
97. "Let justice be done even if the world should perish."
98. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
99. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING

GLASS 63-67 (Grosset & Dunlap 1946) (1865).
100. LEVINAS, supra note 83, at 89-90.
101. Id. at 81.
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man to man."'10 2 Levinas even interprets Life and Fate as a kind of
argument against all efforts to rationalize or systematize the kind
of behavior that the book celebrates:
[Grossman] thinks that the "small goodness" from one person
to his fellowman is lost and deformed as soon as it seeks organization and universality and system, as soon as it opts for
doctrine, a treatise of politics and theology, a party, a state,
and even a church. Yet it remains the sole refuge of the good
in being. Unbeaten, it undergoes the violence of evil, which,
as small goodness, it can neither vanquish nor drive out. A
little kindness going only from man to man, not crossing disA
tances to get to the places where events and forces unfold!
10 3
remarkable utopia of the good or the secret of its beyond.
As this passage suggests, Levinas undoubtedly would have
been horrified at the prospect of any social scientific effort to account for the phenomenon of senseless kindness by reducing it to a
political factoid the numerical value of which could then be compared with the numerical values of other political factoids: horrified, in other words, by CBA. This is in part because CBA concerns itself with the formal and static structure of "things" rather
than with the fluidity of phenomena as they show themselves
through time. 104 Seen from the latter point of view, an "event" is
always singular and never universal. It is always open to-indeed
nurtured by-what Alain Badiou calls the "surprise of the unexpected."'10 5 CBA attempts to smother the unexpected with an intervention that violently abstracts preferences from the unpredictable context of their formation. And there is no better example
of this than CBA's interpretation of the phenomenon of senseless
kindness as the mere expression of a well-formed "preference for
altruism."
IV. The "Preference for Altruism"
Recent CBA scholarship has made a determined effort to
transform the so-called preference for altruism into a monetary
value that can be measured in terms of the market-oriented categories of WTP and WTA. Zerbe, for instance, argues that CBA
should henceforth define as a "good" any value or good for which

102. Id.
103. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ENTRE NOUS: ON THINKING-OF-THE-OTHER 230 (Mi-

chael B. Smith & Barbara Harshav trans., 1998) (1991).
104. SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 20.
105. ALAIN BADIOU, INFINITE THOUGHT 56 (Oliver Feltham & Justin Clemens

eds. & trans., 2003).
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there is a WTP, and he criticizes the traditional economic literature for its arbitrary tendency to ignore and exclude from its calculations many people's obvious WTP for the values of fairness and
kindness toward others.10 6 On this question he is right: any economic analysis that ignores "soft" goods like fairness that people
are actually willing to pay for risks being accused of overt political
bias. But note: the "regard for others" that Zerbe identifies as a
good must be capable of showing itself as a preference before the
project whose net social value it is the job of the economist to ascertain. Margaret Spillane tells a story about Samuel Beckett
that nicely illustrates the category of such a well-defined ex ante
preference for altruism:
Beckett was well-known among Paris street people as an easy
touch. Once while on a stroll with a friend, a beggar offered
his tale of misfortune, and the playwright produced a generous
offering. Shouldn't you consider the possibility, the friend
asked, that the beggar was taking advantage
of you? Replied
10 7
Beckett: "I just couldn't take the chance.
This amusing story is consistent with the commonly held
view that some people are by nature more kindly than others,
while some are inclined more toward what Hobbes calls "our
naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and
the like.' 0 8 But conceiving of an act of altruism as the consequence of a constant character trait or disposition is pre-critical,
and fails to account for the phenomenon of senseless kindness. In
contrast to the well-bounded, conscious, and even calculating preference for altruism displayed in the foregoing story about Beckett
and the beggar, the sort of kindness that Grossman describes in
Life and Fate cannot show itself before the deed. It cannot, by its
very nature or definition, fall within what CBA would call an ex
ante set of preferences or utility function. This is because senseless kindness displays a peculiar property in the way it comes into
being: it does not implement an earlier preference for altruism,
but rather erupts with no prior warning, in a way that squarely
contradicts the actor's previous preference for the very opposite of
altruism.1 0 9 This kind of behavior is "senseless" in the very precise

106. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 24-26.
107. Margaret Spillane, Beckett at 100, THE NATION, May 15, 2006, at 22.
108. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 87 (Ernest Rhys ed., E. P. Dutton & Co. 1914)
(1651).
109. See LEVINAS, supra note 83, at 89 (describing senseless kindness as an unforeseen act of goodness that occurs despite the fact that the actor actually hates
the beneficiary of his or her kindness).
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sense that it contradicts the claims of instrumental reason, which
argue against it on the basis of what is known about the actor's
pre-behavior preferences.
Of course, if cases of senseless kindness exist, then cases of
"senseless cruelty," in which an actor's ex ante preference for altruism suddenly becomes its opposite, probably also exist. 110 But we
are not concerned here with deciding which of these two phenomena is more common. Instead, we should consider the categories of
senseless kindness and senseless cruelty together, and from the
vantage point of what unites them. It then becomes possible to
recognize that these two phenomena are opposite extremes that
mark the boundaries of a general principle of relative social inconstancy in the formation and expression of human preferences. The
point is not just that people often change their minds about what
they want. The point is that they can, and do, change their minds
and their behaviors as a consequence of being with others in particular ways. To express the principle of relative social inconstancy formally: whenever human beings actually get together in
face-to-face encounters, it is always possible that something unexpected will happen between them to alter their preferences, either
completely (the preference for X becomes a preference for its opposite, as in senseless kindness) or partially (an actor's WTP or WTA
changes, or his preference for X becomes a preference for something that is merely like X). For the sake of simplicity, I will continue to use the phenomenon of senseless kindness as the essay's
primary example of the principle of relative social inconstancy.
The time has come to describe the phenomenological structure of
this sort of human interaction more closely.
Senseless kindness is the product of a concrete encounter between human beings who, suddenly and perhaps even unwillingly,
find themselves standing face-to-face with one another. To use a
powerful image drawn from the work of Levinas, 111 in the literal
nakedness of the other's face can be glimpsed the phenomena of
distress and mortality, for every face-to-face encounter between

110. Imagine an actor who genuinely wants to help people in the abstract, but
who winds up actually hurting them (and wanting to hurt them) as a sudden consequence of having concrete dealings with them: this would be a case of "senseless
cruelty." (I am tempted to cite the federal government's ongoing reaction to the
African-American victims of Hurricane Katrina as an example, but I will leave the
regrettably easy task of supplying actual examples of senseless cruelty to the
reader's own memory and imagination.)
111. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, Meaning and Sense, in BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS 33, 54 (Adriaan Peperzak et al. eds., 1996).
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two people-and not just friends-is haunted by the certainty that
one of them will outlive the other.1 12 I say "can be glimpsed" to indicate that the inevitable death of the other is not necessarily encountered as a theme, but that the primordial experience of this
truth shows itself as an existential possibility in every face-to-face
relationship. Levinas describes the phenomenal structure of this
kind of encounter in vivid, almost lyrical terms:
But that face facing me, in its expression-in its mortalitysummons me, demands me, requires me: as if the invisible
death faced by the face of the other-pure alterity, separate,
somehow, from any whole-were 'my business.' As if, unknown by the other whom already, in the nakedness of his
face, it concerns, it 'regarded me' before its confrontation with
me, before being the death that stares me, myself, in the face.
The death of the other man puts me on the spot, calls me into
question, as if I, by my possible indifference, became the accomplice of that death, invisible to the other who is exposed to
it; and as if, even before being condemned to it myself, I had to
answer for that death of the other, and not leave the other
alone to his deathly solitude. It is precisely in that recalling of
me to my responsibility by the face that summons me, that
in that calling into quesdemands me, that requires me-it is 113
tion-that the other is my neighbour.
It is important to understand that Levinas's description of
the ethical encounter that leads to senseless kindness is not an argument for senseless kindness, as if there were too little of it in
the world and he wanted to encourage people to be nicer to one
another. This way of putting it wrongly imagines that senseless
kindness is an event that one can plan for or take aim at on the
basis of an ethical norm or individual preference that could be
taught, as it were, in Sunday school. The phenomenal facts of the
case are otherwise: the essence of senseless kindness consists in
the fact that it stealthily comes upon or surprises the one who, all
of a sudden, finds herself inexplicably exhibiting kindness toward
another human being. In short, Levinas attempts to give a rigorous phenomenological description of what is rather than a normative lecture about what ought to be. He wants to describe something that just happens in daily life-albeit usually in small ways

112. Derrida speaks of this certainty in terms of the relationship between
friends, both of whom know that one of them will outlive the other; on account of
this mutual knowledge of mortality, the friends become what Derrida calls "virtual
survivors" in life. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE WORK OF MOURNING 171 (Pascale-Anne
Brault & Michael Naas eds., 2001).
113. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ALTERITY AND TRANSCENDENCE 24-25 (Michael Smith

trans., 1999).
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that fly under the radar of political and social theory-even if it is
also true that the counter-phenomena of cruelty, greed, and selfishness are often more visible to us.
From the "ex ante point of view" that informs the modern
quest for economic rationality, the possibility that this kind of unpredictable encounter might pop up to disturb an actor's wellthought-out plans and projects involves what CBA would classify
as a "transaction cost." In other words, mainstream economic theory interprets an unwanted face-to-face encounter between people
as a burden rather than a benefit, and it counts the reduction of
transaction costs as an a priori gain rather than the loss of an opportunity for something new and unexpected to emerge. As this
attitude toward transaction costs suggests, mainstream economic
theory nurtures a general political preference for market solutions
to individual and social problems. 114 While the origin of this preference for markets is a normative commitment to efficiency, the
preferred means-the market as such-consists in people coming
together in real or virtual face-to-face encounters. 115 Indeed, the
very existence of the discipline of CBA is based on the recognition
that there can be significant barriers (transaction costs) that prevent otherwise willing people from coming together to achieve efficiencies. 116 The idea that the law should mimic hypothetical market solutions when transaction costs prevent real market solutions
is simply a corollary of economists' general preference for markets. 117 Since it generally considers the pursuit of government
"projects" to be a second-best solution, CBA argues that public policy ought to be guided, or at least informed, by an analysis of the
hypothetical things that people would willingly do with, and to,
118
one another if there were no transaction costs.
The phenomenon of senseless kindness and the general principle of the relative social inconstancy of preferences that it illustrates pose an acute challenge to this way of thinking, for they imply that the coming-together process is not just a "cost." If we take
this phenomenon as a symbol for the general thesis that something unexpected yet desirable can arise whenever human beings
interact, it means that coming together can be a transformative
event. Indeed, thinkers such as Habermas have even argued that
114. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (2003).
115. See 1 WEBER, supra note 20, at 635 (describing "the market").

116. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 9.
117. POSNER, supra note 114, at 251.

118. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 14-33.
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there is an intimate connection between coming together in discussion and the concept of rationality itself. 119 In earnest discussion about what is to be done, the participants make claims that
they attempt to vindicate and criticize through arguments. 120 As
Habermas says, "[i]n virtue of their criticizability, rational expressions also admit of improvement," which implies that to be closed
to argument-to be "deaf' to it-is to be irrational. 121 In attempting to ground our own claims we learn from others, and in learning from others we expose ourselves to the possibility of change.
Thus, "[w]e call a person rational who interprets the nature of his
desires and feelings ... in the light of culturally established standards of value, but especially if he can adopt a reflective attitude
to the very value standards through which desires and feelings are
interpreted."1 22 By bringing us to see certain aspects of a problem
that we did not see before, the "coming together" of discussion
changes us, and thus can change what we prefer.
Of course, not all instances of people coming together involve
the prospect of rational and open-minded argumentation. In many
routine economic transactions an increase in transaction costs
would admittedly burden the parties without any realistic chance
of significantly changing them or their preferences: one thinks of
such simple examples as paying bridge tolls, buying bread, and
reconciling bank statements. If CBA limited the range of application of its theory to these kinds of human interactions, however, it
would be of limited utility to policymakers trying to decide questions of a distinctly political nature, such as whether abortion
should be made more or less available to women, whether the law
should allow or disallow the cloning of human beings, and whether
there should be more or less offshore drilling for oil. In situations
like these, one could argue that what we need is more discussion
(more "transaction costs"), not less-more opportunity for people
to test their preferences, and possibly change them, as a consequence of their interactions with others. To walk a mile in the
other's shoes, as the saying goes, is not the expression of an ex
ante preference for altruism. Rather, it is a necessary precondition for any deliberation in the political sphere that aspires to become rational in the largest and most important sense of the word:
namely, the rational evaluation of one's own ultimate ends in light
119. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 40, at 17.

120. 1 id. at 18.
121. 1 id.
122. 1 id. at 20.
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of knowledge about the ultimate ends of others. Socrates famously
said that the unexamined life is not worth living. 123 But one need
not go as far as he does to conclude that at least an unexamined
preference is not worth having.
If open discussion of the sort Habermas envisages is the
quintessence of rationality, then the preferences of those who exhibit senseless kindness in Life and Fate undergo the kind of
metamorphosis that is, if you will, pre-rational, and that is triggered by what CBA would call the "transaction cost" of a face-toface encounter. All of a sudden there appears, out of nowhere,
what CBA would undoubtedly recognize as a brand new set of
preferences or utility function. Before the Germans entered her
hut, the peasant woman would probably have been "willing to pay"
for all the enemy soldiers in her village, wounded and unwounded
alike, to be strangled; indeed, she says as much herself, the very
instant before she finds herself giving water and comfort to the
gut-shot German who is lying on her cot. 124 An intended course of
action that threatens to become its own negation once the transaction costs of its implementation are incurred is, to say the least, a
very curious kind of revealed preference. Although economists
25
sometimes say that inefficiency arises only in dynamic societies,
the emergence of unexpected choices as a consequence of interpersonal contact seems to show that certain kinds of efficiencies can
arise only when dynamic conditions change people's preferences.
One way or another, one feels entitled to ask what the prospect of
this kind of plasticity in preferences and behavior means for the
very concept of economic rationality.
V. Economic Rationality
As we have seen, economists normally interpret transaction
costs as something negative or bad-as barriers obstructing the
consummation of otherwise efficient transactions. 26 To illustrate:
if A's WTP for a good owned by B is $100, and B's WTA for this
good is $90, then in a world without transaction costs A will acquire the good from B at some price between $90 and $100, and, in
the absence of any negative externalities, 127 the resulting state of
123.
PLATO,
124.
125.
126.
127.

PLATO, Socrates' Defense (Apology), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
supra note 22, at 3, 23.
GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 409.
See, e.g., ZERBE, supra note 10, at 66.
Id. at 22.
A "negative externality" is a cost that the parties to a transaction do not
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affairs will be a Pareto improvement on its predecessor. 128 But if
it would cost the parties jointly at least $11 in transaction costs
(travel costs, negotiation costs, etc.) to complete this transaction,
then economic theory predicts that A and B will not bother to do it,
since no price between $90 and $100 would defray the joint transaction costs that are necessary to effectuate the exchange. 129 Presumably the opportunity cost 130 of spending the $11 to consummate this transaction consists of a set of other, more highly
valued, uses of the parties' time and resources. This being so, the
theory predicts that they will not choose to spend the $11 here, despite the fact that both of them would be better off if the underlying substantive exchange were to occur.
Predictably, matters are not quite as simple and straightforward as this example indicates when it comes to cases in which
the principle of the relative social inconstancy of preferences holds
sway. The previous analysis of senseless kindness shows that
there are situations in which the cost-prohibitive circumstance of
incurring certain transaction costs somehow transforms the very
opposite of an actor's original preference into the good that she
now desires. It is as if a person's WTA of a million dollars for her
last piece of bread suddenly and unaccountably became her WTP
for that bread to be transferred to another. One could even generalize and reformulate this example as a formal paradox: there is a
class of cases such that the circumstance of incurring the inefficiency of excessive transaction costs-owing to a prior miscalculation or to compulsion-leads to a transaction that nonetheless becomes efficient solely because the costs of engaging in it have
produced a transformation of the parties' preferences. Even more
generally, one could say that the possibility of the socially determined unexpected puts into question the very nature of economic
rationality. One need not be a sociologist to recognize that sensebear, but that the transaction itself imposes on one or more other people who, in
principle, would be willing to pay to avoid it. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (1988) (defining "externalities").
128. Zerbe defines the Pareto criterion as follows:
A Pareto optimum is a state of affairs such that no one can be made better
off without making someone else worse off. A change in the economy is
said to represent a Pareto improvement if at least one person is made
better off as a result of the change and no person is made worse off.
ZERBE, supra note 10, at 3. The Pareto criterion is more rigorous than others, such
as KH, because of its requirement that a change "have no losers." Id.
129. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 127, at 85.
130. The "opportunity cost" of a chosen course of action is all the other courses of
action that the actor could have chosen, but that are now foreclosed to him on account of the course he did choose. Id. at 101.
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less kindness, coming as it does to disrupt prior preferences and
redirect action away from their realization, makes visible the challenge that the interconnected phenomena of temporality and human sociality pose to the definition of the "ex ante" in CBA.
Richard Posner correctly observes that "to an economist people who will not make exchanges that improve their net welfare
are irrational." 131 But it is also true that today's economic theorists do not assess an individual's net welfare in terms of universal
criteria, or cardinal utility: it is for the individual herself to decide
which goods, or bundle of goods, will make her best off relative to
her preferences. 132 As I have noted already, recent economic theory has introduced the altruistic regard for others into CBA-a
theoretical move that thankfully dispels the widely-held misconception that the criterion of economic rationality is satisfied only
by choices that maximize an individual's selfish material interests. 133 After all, if I would be willing to pay for a more equal distribution of resources in society, despite the fact that my own
monetary income might decline as a consequence, there is no nondogmatic (or at least non-normative) point of view that can reproach my choice as irrational. 134 Notice that this relatively modest theoretical concession to the possibility of a WTP for altruistic
ends is not the same as claiming, as John Rawls does, that the
concept of rational self-regard logically entails that social institutions be arranged so as to maximize the portion of the least welloff in society.1 35 As we have seen, microeconomic theory makes no
claims about universal rational values. Rather, its procedures correspond to Weber's well-known schema of rational action: (1) an
action is regarded as subjectively rationalif it is directed toward a
goal that the actor values, whatever that goal may be; and (2) the
action is taken to be objectively irrationalonly if the actor adopts
means to achieve his selected goal that are less well-suited than
other available means. 136 In other words, "subjective rationality"
is a purely descriptive category-the actor just has whatever pref-

131. POSNER, supra note 114, at 51.
132. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 127, at 17-20.

133. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
134. Although nothing of importance depends on it here, it should be noted that
one consequence of including the preference for altruism in efficiency calculations
is that a state of affairs can arise in which aggregate WTPs outweigh aggregate
WTAs without the potential compensation test being satisfied. ZERBE, supra note
10, at 19.
135. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 151 (1971).

136. BRUBAKER, supra note 27, at 53-55.
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erences she has, for whatever reason-whereas the category of
"objective rationality," although unquestionably normative, is limited to assessing the effectiveness of the technique the actor has
137
adopted to achieve her particular end.
Put another way, CBA believes it is required to accept individual preferences as primordial givens for purposes of its analyses of net social welfare. That is, as a matter of principle, WTPs
and WTAs are supposed to be functions of what people just happen
to prefer at any given point in time, and never functions of what a
CBA analyst thinks they must or ought to prefer. In theory, the
decision of a monk who has taken a vow of poverty to get rid of all
his money and possessions is just as economically rational as the
average person's decision to work overtime in order to earn more
of what the monk is trying to give away. However, the stipulation
that all preferences are radically subjective in this way underscores how important it is for CBA to select the "right" point in
time to sum them up, for people's preferences can and often do
change. If I am willing to pay $1 for an apple instead of a candy
bar at ti, and this point in time is the taken to be the relevant ex
ante, then my subsequent behavior of buying a candy bar at t2 appears irrational. On the other hand, if we take t2 as the relevant
ex ante, then my new preference for a candy bar over an apple
makes my act of purchasing it look rational. It all depends on
which "when" the analyst selects.
The problem of selecting the right ex ante is even more difficult in the context of trying to give a theoretical account of the
phenomenon of senseless kindness. Consider, for instance, the two
examples from Life and Fate. As of which ex ante are the Russian
women's preferences to be determined: the ex ante that precedes
the moment of facing the hated German soldiers toward whom the
women will subsequently act "irrationally" by displaying senseless
kindness, or the ex ante that all of a sudden bursts forth to reflect
their new desire to be kind to the needy human beings whom they
face, and that therefore shows their behavior to be "rational"? And
if, as Zerbe maintains emphatically, the proper purpose of CBA is
"to provide useful information to the decision maker, and not to
furnish the decision itself,"138 then what information should the
decision maker get if the possibility of an unpredictable social
transformation of an individual's preferences lurks just around the
temporal corner of any given analysis of ex ante WTPs and WTAs?
137. Id.
138. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 16.
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Among other things, these questions show that method matters. The way we approach any subject determines not just how
we proceed but also what we look for and find. Einstein stressed
this dialectical relationship between the how of method and the
what of facts when he said, "How a magnitude is measured is what
it is."139 CBA is no exception to Einstein's rule. What CBA looks
for and finds is a mathematical relationship between WTPs and
WTAs. Calling these phenomena themselves manifestations of individual preferences, CBA proceeds to sum them up and then recommend, or at least provide information about, hypothetical endstates according to a test that most mainstream economists and
lawyers accept as the definition of "economic efficiency": the Kaldor-Hicks (KH) efficiency criterion. 140 While KH can be expressed
in a variety of ways, for purposes of this essay I will adopt the
definition given by Boadway and Bruce: "[S]tate a is preferable to
another state if, in the other state, it is not possible, hypothetically, to carry out lump-sum redistribution so that everyone could
141
be made as well off as in state a."
The questions posed above show that a tool or criterion of
public policy that asks what individuals would be willing to pay or
accept for something is useless without a temporal referencepoint-a determination of when they would be willing to open
their wallets. This observation about method makes it possible to
recognize that there is an entire philosophy of time and history
implicit in Boadway's and Bruce's definition of economic efficiency.
Not only does the notion of a "state" in which people "have" prefer-

139. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS

200

(Raymond Har-

greaves & Roger White eds. & trans., 1975).
140. Also known as the "potential compensation" and "wealth maximization"
test, KH arose in response to the impracticability of using the Pareto criterion of
efficiency as a tool of public policy. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 4. The latter requires
both that at least one person will be made better off by the move from the status
quo to the proposed new state, and that no one will be made worse off. Id. at 3.
"Potential compensation" assures that the winners in the new state are able, in
theory, to compensate the losers for their losses, with net gains remaining that improve the winners' welfare relative to their previous positions. In other words, KH
is aimed at increasing net social welfare, which is why Richard Posner has called it
the "wealth maximization" test. Id. at 5. The redistribution actually occuring is
not a requirement of the KH test as such, although Zerbe has called for actual
compensation to be included in CBA calculations to the extent that there is any
willingness to pay for it. Id. at 18. Zerbe's modification of KH, primarily through
his inclusion of the preference for altruistic goods within CBA, has led him and
other economists to change the test's name to "KHM," for Kaldor-Hicks-Moral. See
Richard 0. Zerbe, Yoram Bauman & Aaron Finkle, An Aggregate Measure for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 58 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 449 (2006).
141. NORMAN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 97 (1984).
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ences presuppose a discrete point in time at which their WTPs to
change this state to another state and WTAs to let the change occur can be measured, but also this notion interprets time itself as
a mere sequence of "states," each of which, when viewed in isolation, is static and fully determinable. CBA refers to the original
state-in-time of a given series of states as the "ex ante perspective"
(literally "from [or out of] before," in Latin). 142 Since the problem
that CBA wants to solve is whether a move from one state to another state is efficient, CBA answers the question, "Before what?"
with the concept of the "project."143 From a purely logical point of
view, a project consists in the means that would have to be
adopted to achieve the purely hypothetical end-state under review-an idealized new state that may or may not be more efficient than the ex ante state. This shows how CBA conceives of legitimate public policymaking in democratic societies: namely, in
terms of a self-conscious movement from a static and real present
"state" to a static and hypothetical future "state" on the basis of
people's preferences as measured before progress toward the second state begins.
Well-established scientific methods tend to assert their hegemony over every problem that falls within their domain, including new problems that seem to question the accuracy of their findings or the legitimacy of their conclusions. 144 Perhaps this is
inevitable, for as Arendt correctly observes, in the act of judgment
"[o]nly the individual case is judged, not the standard [of judgment] itself or whether it is an appropriate measure of what it is
used to measure."'145 Hence, given CBA's presuppositions about
time and history, it would be understandable if its practitioners
preferred to achieve a technical economic solution to the "problem"
of senseless kindness. One possible solution would be to evade the
problem altogether by asserting that any given value of WTP or
WTA already includes the subjectively liquidated possibility that
its bearer will subsequently and unexpectedly change her mind.
The difficulty with this solution is obvious: how is the actor supposed to know what discount rate to pick if the possibility of
change is truly unexpected to her? A more plausible alternative
would be to attempt to account objectively for the possibility of

142.
143.
144.
1970).
145.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (8th ed. 1999).
See, e.g., ZERBE, supra note 10, at 16.
See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
ARENDT, supra note 89, at 102.
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preference reversal by incorporating it into the model on the basis
of empirical evidence that would not necessarily be available to
the actor. In the case of senseless kindness, one could discount the
present value of an actor's ex ante preference for the very opposite
of kindness by the general probability that an actor like her might
choose to be kind as a consequence of a subsequent social interaction. 146 To illustrate: if the peasant woman in Life and Fate would
have been willing to pay something to have the wounded soldier in
her cottage strangled before he asked her for some water, then we
could reduce the value of her WTP for this "project" by the ex ante
probability that she might subsequently change her mind and feel
kindly toward him. Only by this means could CBA begin to conform its calculations to an existential truth that ought to be visible
to any rational adult who has ever tried to accomplish something
in the world: namely, that much of history is "made by men who
never know what they are doing and always arrive at letting loose,
as it were, something different from what they [originally] intended and wanted to happen." 147 Accounting for senseless kindness in this way would then seem to be a simple matter computing
the overall empirical frequency of its occurrence. And in principle
one could perform the same kind of operation to account for the
possibility of senseless cruelty.
However attractive or plausible this theoretical solution may
appear, there are two reasons why it will not suffice. The first is
merely technical. It will be recalled that senseless kindness and
senseless cruelty are limiting cases of a much larger category-the
principle of the relative social inconstancy of preferences. If one
takes as one's object of analysis the more general phenomenon of
an unexpected change in preferences as a consequence of human interaction, then it is difficult to see how a reliable discount factor
could ever be ascertained, since the set of possible outcomes is
well-nigh infinite. In other words, senseless kindness and senseless cruelty tend to exhibit a binary structure: we know what the
actor's initial preference is, and we need only consider the possibility that the very antithesis of this outcome will be the one that she
winds up preferring. The case is otherwise for situations that fall
between these two extremes: who knows all of the novel solutions
or strange new worlds that might be imagined if the people who

146. Of course, in a world without transaction costs this information would also
be available to the actor, who could then discount her own WTP or WTA in the
same way that an economic observer could.
147. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 16.
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would be affected by a proposed project had ample opportunity to
discuss and debate it, face to face?
Despite the cogency of this rhetorical question, its claim of
epistemological difficulty or uncertainty hardly furnishes a fully
satisfying theoretical answer to CBA in this context. The second
objection to any attempt to hastily enact a merely technical solution to the present problem is quite different. This objection is far
more radical and will lead us into a decisive confrontation with the
very essence of CBA as a socio-political institution. In brief, even
if CBA were to discover an adequate actuarial solution to all of the
technical problems that are raised by the principle of the relative
social inconstancy of preferences, such a solution would suffer
from the absence of any critical reflection on the ultimate meaning
of senseless kindness for humans as social and political beings. At
present, the practitioners of CBA take the meaning of their factual
findings to be self-evident: if the sum of all the WTPs for a proposed project exceeds the sum of all its WTAs, then society in general would be better off than it is at present, relative to the bankable preferences of its members, if the project were to proceed.
But there is something important that is missing from this commonsensical interpretation of CBA's findings: namely, serious reflection about the difference between a fact and the meaning of a
fact.

VI. Facts and Meaning
Understanding the difference between a fact and its meaning
is absolutely essential to any thinking that aspires to be nondogmatic. At one level the difference is obvious: the sheer physical
fact that a particular traffic light is colored red, for example, is obviously not the same as what its redness signifies to drivers. Much
less obvious is the distinction between the purely factual vignettes
that Grossman calls "senseless kindness," 148 each of which is a
one-of-a-kind event that will never happen again, and what these
stories signify about possibilities for democratic politics that go
beyond those envisioned or presupposed by CBA. Given CBA's relentlessly mathematical interpretation of human preferences, it is
useful to illustrate the fact/meaning dichotomy here by drawing an
149
analogy to Husserl's meditations on modern mathematics.
148. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 409.

149. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 21-100. For a respectful but relentless deconstruction of Husserl's most important text on mathematics, see JACQUES DERRIDA,
EDMUND HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY: AN INTRODUCTION (John Leavey trans.,
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Husserl, who was the founder of phenomenology as a selfconscious philosophical movement, became interested in the historical fact that modern algebra had seemingly reduced geometrical thought from the origin of significant descriptions of spatiotemporal idealities to a mere calculating machine.1 50 To illustrate:
modern algebra replaces the evocative idea of a circle as an area
that is inscribed by a straight line of determinate length as it rotates 360 degrees around a single point in two-dimensional space
2
2
with the more rigorous and useful formula for a circle, x + y =
r 2.151 Husserl concedes that this kind of methodological change in
the way geometry is practiced constitutes a clear advancement in
mathematical technique, but he nonetheless goes on to observe
that the change brought with it a major transformation in the
15 2
meaning of mathematics.
Kant had attempted to demonstrate that the proofs of classical Euclidean geometry more or less correspond to, or mirror, our
concrete intuitions of space. 53 Algebraic geometry radically transforms the relationship between proof and intuition by making the
former into a set of pure numerical configurations. 154 It is worth
quoting at some length Husserl's interpretation of the significance
of this ultimately technological shift in the nature of mathematical
phenomena:
In algebraic calculation, one lets the geometric signification
recede into the background as a matter of course, indeed one
drops it altogether; one calculates, remembering only at the
end that the numbers signify magnitudes. Of course one does
not calculate "mechanically," as in ordinary numerical calculation; one thinks, one invents, one makes discoveries-but they
have acquired, unnoticed, a displaced, "symbolic" meaning....
Like arithmetic itself, in technically developing its methodology [algebraic geometry] is drawn into a process of transformation, through which it becomes a sort of technique; that is,
it becomes a mere art of achieving, through a calculating technique according to technical rules, results the genuine sense of
whose truth can be attained only by concretely intuitive thinking actually directed at the subject matter itself. But now
[only] those modes of thought, those types of clarity which are
Univ. of Neb. Press 1989) (1962).
150. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 44-46.
151. See DOUGLAS DOWNING, DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS TERMS 41-42 (2d ed.

1995).
152. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 46-48.
153. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 158 (Paul Guyer & Allen

Wood eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781).
154. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 43-46.
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indispensable for a technique as such, are in action. One operates with letters and with signs for connections and relations (+, X, =,etc.), according to rules of the game for arranging them together in a way essentially not different, in fact,
from a game of cards or chess. Here the originalthinking that
genuinely gives meaning to this technical
process and truth to
155
the correct results

. . .

is excluded.

In this passage Husserl makes a very specific philosophical point
that echoes a similar one made by Spinoza more than 200 years
earlier, 156 and that foreshadows some of the ideas that would
appear decades later in Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of
mathematics. 5 7
The point is quite simple: the truth of
mathematical propositions (what we call mathematical knowledge)
depends upon more than just a correct series of calculations. A
mathematical proposition may be proved, but it is not understood
unless and until it can be viewed with perspicuity-until a
concrete image gives meaning to the symbols in the proof. 58 As
Wittgenstein puts it:
Perspicuity is part of proof. If the process by means of which I
get a result were not surveyable, I might indeed make a note
that this number is what comes out-but what fact is this
supposed to
confirm for me? I don't know "what is supposed to
1 59
come out."'
While much more could be said, both pro and con, about the ultimate significance of imaginability and perspicuity in mathematics,
for present purposes it is sufficient to notice a more general aspect
of Husserl's analysis: namely, his recognition that, when it comes
to scientific techniques, there is a fundamental conceptual distinction between facts and the meaning of facts.
Taking Husserl's distinction between facts and meaning as
our clue, it becomes possible to interpret CBA as a quintessential
manifestation of what Husserl's most famous student, Martin Heidegger, would come to call "the framework" (Ge-stell).160 According
to Heidegger, the framework is none other than an entire orienta-

155. Id. at 44-46.
156. See BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, On the Improvement of the Understanding,in
ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING; THE ETHICS, CORRESPONDENCE 1,

24-27 (R.H.M. Elwes ed. & trans., Dover Publ'ns 1955) (arguing that well-formed
conceptions are the test of the truth or falsity of mathematical ideas).
157. See

S.G. SHANKER,

WITTGENSTEIN

AND

THE

TURNING-POINT

IN

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 120-60 (1987) (stating that proofs must be "surveyable").
158. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 40-45.
159. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 90, at 45e.
160. HEIDEGGER, supra note 26, at 19.
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tion to being-in-the-world: it subjects the natural and social worlds
to the imperatives of mastery and possession according to correct
procedure. 161 Of course, it goes without saying that pre-modern
humans also desired to master and possess their environment.
But only modern humans seek to master and control everything on
the basis of correct procedure. Caught in the web of the framework, modern human beings devote themselves to the planning
and calculating of everything, to such a degree that reality itself is
allowed to appear only within the horizon of what can be calculated. 162 As a spawn of the metaphysical tradition of subjectivity
that began in earnest with Descartes, CBA projects a mathisis
universalis over human relationships, and it identifies the essence
of human reason with calculation. 163 In practicing CBA, the "I
think" of the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum164 finds objectivity in
purely arithmetical relations, in the summing-up of relevant numerical data. Objectivity (as thus determined) permits conclusions to be drawn and political action to be oriented on the basis of
criteria that present themselves as apolitical, if not anti-political.
Among other things, this means that CBA does not conceive
of a political project as the ongoing product of the complex giveand-take of interpersonal dialogue and persuasion among equals,
as it may have been in the polis of ancient Athenian democracy
during its golden age. 165 The hypothetical project about which
people are supposed to have measurable WTPs and WTAs does not
have to be made up by them, and indeed it almost never is. On the
contrary, it is an idealized conception of a state of affairs that does
not in fact exist, and whose contents are usually determined by
politicians or interest groups eager to "sell" it to the public. CBA
therefore interprets the project as a hypothesis whose ideality is
firmly secured in advance by some human agency or other so that
it may then be sold to the highest bidders in a "market" that determines what is and is not efficient. As the quotation marks
around the word "market" indicate, however, this market is virtual rather than real, just as the project itself is merely hypotheti-

161. For a general discussion of Heidegger's critique of modern technology and
"technological thinking," see WOLCHER, supra note 87, at 65-120.
162. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 35 (J. Glenn Gray ed., Joan

Stambaugh trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1957).
163. 1

RENt

DESCARTES,

Meditations
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First Philosophy,

in

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 1, 17 (John Cottingham et al. trans.,
1985).

164. 1 id.
165. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 117.
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cal. This is because the whole point of CBA is to gather information about the idea of projects for which existing, real markets do
not provide solutions. CBA's virtual market, governed by a rigorously mathematical conception of efficiency, becomes the framework that decision makers feel they should impose on the concrete
flow of historical time. It follows that CBA cannot be adequately
understood if it is conceived of as merely a means-a mere "practical measure" for "practical people," as Zerbe puts it.166 It must
also be understood as a way of revealing what is real-a way of being and thinking that does not simply apply a neutral method to
pre-methodological "facts," but rather determines in advance what
counts as a fact.
At this point, I do not think it would be unfair to mention my
rather unscientific impression, based on my countless conversations with CBA aficionados, of CBA's generally baleful attitude
toward politics. In a nutshell, it seems to me that many or most of
those who are drawn to CBA as a policymaking tool construe politics as a slimy if not dangerous practice. If this is so, then CBA
shares in the deeply embedded intellectual antipathy to politics
that Arendt traces to a fundamental conflict between philosophy
and politics in Western thought-a conflict which began with the
trial of Socrates and was thereafter nurtured by the powerful influence of Plato's political philosophy. 167 In any case, when politics
is seen from a jaundiced and mistrustful point of view, it can always appear as a mere means in the service of the well-formed
selfish ends of interested persons and groups. 168 Political interventions are thus burdened with the suspicion that they will make
most people worse off at the end of the day with reference to individual preferences that are themselves regarded as pre- or apolitical. President Reagan distilled this suspicion to its essence
when he uttered the following infamous remark in 1988: "There
seems to be an increasing awareness of something we Americans
have known for some time: that the ten most dangerous words in
the English language are, 'Hi, I'm from the Government, and I'm
here to help."' 169 For those who harbor such sentiments, politics
166. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 1.
167. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 5-39.
168. For a useful analysis of the social-theoretical aspects of this "conflict" model
of politics, which is embraced by many people on both sides of the political spectrum, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITIcAL LEGAL STUDIES 247-49 (1987).
169. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Representatives of the Future Farmers of America (July 28, 1988) (transcript available at http://www.reagan.utexas.
edu/archives/speeches/19881072888.c.htm).
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must truly seem to be "the continuation of war by other means." 170
Arendt's idea that politics, in the largest sense of the word, is
an end in itself-that it is the neverending endeavor of human beings to live together and share the earth-is completely foreign to
this way of thinking. 171 The so-called "transaction costs" of political interaction in her sense are not deadweight losses imposed
from without on preferences that would otherwise exist without
politics. On the contrary, political interaction constitutes the very
actuality of what are called individual preferences about public
matters, at least when the phenomenon of having preferences is
considered as a concrete, rather than an abstract, manifestation of
human life. To be sure, it is always possible to dip one's net into
the river of time at this or that arbitrary moment, and to bring up
a pallid and one-time expression of the balance between WTPs and
WTAs in relation to a hypothetical project the prospect of which is
more or less given to people on a "take it or leave it" basis. Indeed,
the democratic institution of popular voting in referenda follows
just this model of decision making. But any strong comparison between CBA and the referendum process would be inapt, for CBA is
definitely not a popularly authorized voting apparatus, nor are the
projects it analyzes decided by counting official ballots on the democratic principle of "one man,one vote."1 72 On the contrary, CBA
is unabashedly and explicitly plutocratic in its methods, inasmuch
as the very concept of willingness to pay presupposes that the political process has already distributed a set of entitlements with
which preference holders could pay. 173 Moreover, as a matter of
principle, CBA can have nothing to say about the legitimacy, or
even the efficiency, of any given distribution of entitlements, since
the normative concept of efficiency presupposes that entitlements
174
have already been distributed.
170. MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED" 15 (Mauro Bertani &

Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., Picador 2003) (1997). Foucault
strikingly inverted the famous epigram derived from Clausewitz, who said (in
translation), "War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a
continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means."
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 544 (15th ed., Emily Morison Beck ed.,

1980).
171. ARENDT, supra note 89 passim.
172. See Walter M. Frank, Help Wanted: The Constitutional Case Against Gerrymandering to Protect ConstitutionalIncumbents, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227, 235
(2006).
173. KELMAN, supra note 168, at 74-76.
174. Kelman's way of expressing this point is typical:

[Tihe theory that rights might mirror the outcome of transactionally costless bargains is inexorably indeterminate in that there is no way to deter-

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 25:147

If the ultimate foundation of politics should consist in the individual and her choices, as democratic liberalism maintains, then
it is also true that "[c]hoices are manifest at particular points in
time, but individuals have ongoing identities."'175 To express this
point more precisely, in Hegelian terms: the truth of a person's political preferences is not what her WTPs or WTAs are at any particular moment in time, but rather what her preferences are constantly becoming as a concrete result of her ongoing interactions
and experiences with others. 176 Although Hegel developed a political theory of his own on the basis of this insight, it was Arendt, as
we shall see in the next two sections, who transformed the dialectics of human existence into a particularly attractive positive vision of political becoming on the basis of individual freedom and
democratic principles. 77 Always a melancholy realist, she acknowledged that there is an "extraordinarily narrow horizon of
experience left open to us for politics commensurate with the experiences of our century."'7 8 She even admitted that "[p]olitics as
such has existed so rarely and in so few places that, historically
speaking, only a few great epochs have known it and turned it into
a reality."'179 Nevertheless, her extraordinary idea that genuine
deliberative democracy can be an end in itself, rather than just another "method" of decision making, gamely attempts to re-conceive
our relationships with others from a model of strife and competition to a model of discussion and cooperation among free people
sharing the earth as members of a political community. 8 0 This
thesis, however idealistic and utopian it may appear from the
jaded standpoint of twenty-first century American political experience, stands in the sharpest possible contrast to the presuppositions and tendencies of CBA. And this very contrast reveals a
schism that is inherently political rather than scientific.

mine which rights people possess when they enter this universal bargain
to determine rights, and no way of determining how much market power
each person has unless one has already determined those rights.
Id. at 75.
175. Id. at 130.
176. See generally HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 105-223 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821) (discussing the dialectical unfolding of "Ethical Life,"
or Sittlickkeit, within the context of the state).
177. See generally ARENDT, supra note 89, at 70-200.
178. Id. at 197.
179. Id. at 119.
180. See generally id. at 115-53.
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VII. CBA's Anti-Politics
While disclaiming in advance any intention to fawn on the
ancients, I will begin our investigation of this political schism by
citing Aristotle, who wrote that "man is by nature a political animal [zCon politikon]."181 This implies that anyone who dwells outside the political community lives a kind of mutilated or nonhuman existence, which Aristotle compares to that of "an isolated
piece at draughts." 18 2 "Political animal" in Aristotle's sense does
not just mean that human beings join political parties or like to
read newspapers. It means that by their very nature people tend
to form and sustain communities in which the genuine conduct of
public and private affairs is first made possible.18 3 "Politics" derives from the Greek word polis, meaning "city-state," which constituted the Greeks' primary form of political community.18 4 Indeed, in Periclean Athens at the height of its glory it was felt that
85
the entire life of the state was contained in its politeia.1
A cognate of the word "polis,"politeia signifies the unity of culture and
politics, as well as of private and public life, within the confines of
the polis.186 To this end, the dominant cultural ideal of Athenian
democracy required all freeborn male citizens to discharge their
public duties through mutual interaction and the discussion of
public affairs1 8 7 in the agora (literally, "marketplace"), the central
space for the exercise of freedom in the city, where it was believed
18 8
that men could move around and speak freely with their equals.
These days it is quite common for people in democratic societies to view civic responsibility as a burden or hassle.18 9 But it
would appear that the Greeks saw the matter differently. Far
from being thought of as a curse or burden, the "bond of friendship
and union" between men that Socrates places at the very foundation of the polis'9° indicates a thesis or attitude that may sound
181. 2 ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 1987
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
182. 2 id. at 1988.
183. 2 id. at 1986-88.
184. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 117.
185. 1 WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 409-10 (2d ed.,
Gilbert Highet trans., 1939).
186. 1id. at 410.
187. 1 id.
188. ARENDT, supra note 89, at xxvi, 131.
189. See Bob Herbert, Of Campaigns and Breakfast Cereals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 2004, at A19.
190. PLATO, Protagoras,in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 22,
at 308, 319-20.
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strange to modern ears-one that the formal structure of CBA
cannot accommodate. The thesis in question is not nearly as
broad as Marx's collectivistic conception of the "species-life" of human beings,' 9' but rather consists in the more modest claim that
human interactions have a positive influence or value that goes far
beyond whatever "projects" they may happen to ratify or initiate. 192 For the Greeks, human interaction and discussion in the
agorawere not just means to establish previously determined public and private ends, because thinking about politics in this way
would have impermissibly reduced free Athenian citizens to the
unequal status of ruler and ruled. 193 As Arendt puts it, "[t]he
Greeks understood the polis as the public-political realm in which
men attain their full humanity, their full reality as men, not only
because they are (as in the privacy of the household) but also because they appear."'194 According to this ancient Greek ideal of
popular democracy, the dialogue of free citizens in the agora was a
necessary step toward the formation of wise ends and wise citi195
zens.
The funeral oration of Pericles, as recounted by Thucydides,
makes this last point explicitly:
Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to
attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the
pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for,
unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in
these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians
are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way
of action, we think it an indispensablepreliminaryto any wise
19 6
action at all.

The Athenian view that public and private discourse is a good
thing-that it is not a "stumbling block in the way of action," but
rather a necessary precondition for wise action-can be described
in modern economic terms by the proposition that human
interactions are prima facie net benefits rather than net costs.
Whether or not Pericles accurately depicts political conditions in
mid-fifth century Athens, it is clear that the general bias of
191. KARL MARX, Bruno Bauer, Die Judenfrage, in EARLY WRITINGS 3, 13 (T.B.
Bottomore ed. & trans., 1964).
192. Id. at 172.

193. 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 181, at 1986-2000.
194. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 21.
195. Id. at xxvi, 119.
196. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 109-10 (Richard Crawley trans.,
Random House 1982) (n.d.) (emphasis added).
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modern economists, including the practitioners of law and
economics, on the subject of human interactions is the exact
opposite of the one he expresses. Modern economic theory tends to
interpret human discourse as a cost to be overcome or minimized,
rather than celebrated.
According to the standard economic account of transaction
costs, the burden of dealing with others, if incurred, will reduce
the net value of any resulting transaction, and if not incurred, will
be suspected of having prevented the consummation of a mutually
beneficial exchange. Either way, transaction costs are said to be
bad. The following passage, from a popular series of books describing various legal topics, is typical:
A problem, which Professor Coase readily recognized, is that
virtually all exchanges have a cost. These costs are called
transaction costs. It is important to note that a transaction
cost is not the price of an item or a right. Instead, it is the cost
of the transaction itself. These costs include search costs, information costs, the cost of meetings, negotiations, and any
other costs incurred to make the primary exchange occur. If
these costs exceed the gain from the exchange itself, the exchange will not take place. 197
The presumption that human interactions are "costs" is associated
with Ronald Coase's enormously influential article The Problem of
Social Cost.198 One of the primary implications of Coase's work is
that people often choose inefficient solutions to social problems "in
order to avoid the cost of getting together," as Mitchell Polinsky
puts it (thereby making it appear that "getting together" is
something humans generally would rather not do).19 9 Law and
economics scholars also subscribe to the normative idea that the
law ought to facilitate private agreements by reducing transaction
costs, including "the need ... to communicate information," as
Douglas Baird says (thereby implying that human discourse is
generally an unwanted burden). 200 Finally, as noted earlier, many
scholars believe that judges ought to decide difficult legal cases so
that the result mimics the outcome that the parties would have

197. JEFFREY HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 72 (3d ed. 2003).

198. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
199. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-15

(3d ed. 2003).
200. Douglas Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages, in CHICAGO
LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 49, 61 (Eric Posner ed., 2000); accord COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 127, at 101 (interpreting communications costs as "obstacles to
cooperation").
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achieved had there been no transaction costs. 20 1
As one of the principal applications of modern economic theory, CBA echoes the general antipathy to transaction costs in law
and economics literature. Moreover, CBA practitioners imagine
that we know our goals in advance, if given the right amount of
"information," and that this knowledge automatically sanctions
the use of the most efficient means for achieving them. CBA's calculations cannot accommodate the possibility that our political
goals might actually be "up for grabs" so long as we act as social
beings during the polis-like activity of thinking, talking and being
with one another. While I do not mean to suggest that we need to
return to the conditions of Athenian democracy, built as it was on
the backs of slaves and the legal subordination of women, 20 2 I do
want to criticize the idea that human interactions are first and
foremost costs that should be avoided or minimized. I want to
suggest that what economic theory calls the "transaction costs" of
human discourse is actually what makes people into free and responsible agents in the first place. Habermas is right that there is
an internal relation between the capacity for instrumental reason
and the capacity for reaching inter-subjective understanding about
things and events. 20 3 This is because an actor's successful use of
instrumental reason in a social context implies the ability to make
his point of view understood by others whose cooperative actions
are necessary to achieve his ends. Habermas calls the latter ability "communicative action," and his analysis suggests that empiricist research traditions such as CBA have put the idea of communicative, social rationality into a kind of intellectual quarantine,
leaving only instances of pure instrumental rationality to be ana20 4
lyzed and measured.
This quarantine allows CBA to conceive of human beings as
vessels that at any given point in time are chock full of wellformed preferences. Since it is undeniable that conditions in the
real world are always changing, however, this means that CBA
must interpret inefficiencies as the product of institutionalfailure.
That is, it must allege that legal rules have failed to keep pace
with changes in sentiments, knowledge, or technology. Zerbe's
201. POSNER, supra note 114, at 251.

202. See, e.g., John R. Kroger, The PhilosophicalFoundations of Roman Law:
Aristotle, the Stoics, and Roman Theories of Natural Law, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 905,
919-20 (discussing Aristotle's justification of slavery); id. at 919 n.68 (discussing
status of women under classical Athenian law).
203. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 40, at 14.

204. See 1 id.
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version of the argument is illustrative: "Inefficiency arises only in
a nonstauc socleLy-liu, ib, a dynamic society. 'When conditions
change a different, new rule may lower transaction costs or create
new property for which rights need to be assigned, or a change in
conditions may create an inefficient divergence between psychological and legal ownership." 20 5 This way of thinking about the relationship between preferences and entitlements rests on the belief that these two spheres are functionally autonomous from one
another. It supposes that public institutions such as law are
merely the externally imposed mechanism within which bargaining in the private sphere transpires. There is no clearer example
of this belief than CBA's concept of "tautological efficiency," the
view that if the costs of changing legal rules are taken into account, then "every society is always completely efficient as a tautology." 20 6 The idea seems to be that if the costs of a rule change

were small enough, then the change, if it is efficient, would have
already occurred; and if the change in rules has not occurred, this
proves that it would not be cost-justified.
This way of thinking about the relation between social and
legal change contains an inherent logical limitation. By interpreting time as a succession of static "states," each one of which is full
of well-formed preferences, CBA leaves itself powerless to account
for how preferences change, or even how they stay the same. At
best it can only observe that preferences have changed or stayed
the same, once they have been manifested. Nowhere in Zerbe's
thesis of tautological efficiency does the possibility appear that legal rules and other public institutions are or could be an ongoing
project and product of the kind of communicative action among individuals that thinkers such as Habermas and Arendt imagine
they might be. Communicative action of this sort cannot know in
advance exactly where it is going. Nor can it guarantee in advance that CBA will be able to bless its outcomes as efficient, since
efficiency requires evaluation according to a prior "state" that,
however recently it may have been measured, may no longer be
relevant to what people have now talked themselves into wanting.
This is exactly the problem that the phenomenon of senseless
kindness creates for the concept of economic rationality.
To say that people can talk themselves into wanting something different than they did before they started talking with one
another is obviously not the same as saying that this kind of be205. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 66.
206. Id. at 65.
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havior is irrational. On the contrary, human interaction, even if it
is sometimes undesired before the fact, allows people the space for
what Kant called "spontaneity. ' 20 7 In brief, spontaneity means the
capacity to initiate new ideas, understandings, and preferences as
a consequence of our interactions with others. 208 This realm of
spontaneity is the exact opposite of the realm of necessity that
CBA constructs in determining the relation between individual
ends and the means used for their accomplishment. For CBA, a
person's preference for or against project X automatically links up
with its means, either a measurable WTP to achieve X, or a measurable WTA to avoid it. Thus, all spontaneity is excluded from the
calculus. But without spontaneity people could never commence
anything new. They would remain perpetual slaves of their unchangeable wants, mere tools of previously articulated preferences
that they are helpless to avoid or alter. This observation about the
relationship between preferences and spontaneity suggests the
truth of Arendt's surprising thesis that politics and freedom are
actually the same:
Only in the freedom of our speaking with one another does the
world, as that about which we speak, emerge in its objectivity
and visibility from all sides. Living in a real world and speaking with one another about it are basically one and the
same.... Freedom to depart and begin something new and
unheard-of or ...the freedom to interact in speech with many
others and experience the diversity that the world always is in
its totality-most certainly was and is not the end purpose of
politics ...something that can be achieved by political means.
It is rather the substance and meaning of all things
political.
20 9
In this sense, politics and freedom are identical.
Arendt's point is really quite simple: to be completely locked
within oneself and one's desires (which in any case is metaphysically impossible) is to exist without freedom, in the precise sense
of existing without any reason to imagine or begin something new.
Never surprised, such a being would be perpetually enslaved to
what is boringly familiar to it, like a zoo animal in a cage. It takes
talking and being with others to imagine and create change-to
disturb the given world and transform it into what it can become. 210 Even a solitary individual maintains a kind of virtual

207. KANT, supra note 153, at 193.
208. Id. at 193-95.
209. ARENDT, supra note 89, at xxx-xxxi.
210. This point is meant to be explicitly Hegelian in content and tone. See, e.g.,
G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 111-19 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) (1807)
(the famous "Lordship and Bondage" dialectic).
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companionship in his thoughts, in the form of what Plato calls the
eme emautd, or internal dialogue that one has with oneself, 211 in
which one prepares for the real dialogues with others that will
come later. If we use the word politics as Arendt does-as a name
for the basic human phenomenon of "venturing forth in speech and
deed in the company of one's peers, beginning something new
whose end cannot be known in advance, founding a public realm
(res publica or republic), promising and forgiving others" 212-then
CBA's preference (or prejudice) against politics becomes clear. It
is an implicit preference against freedom. By reducing the concept
"human being" to a preference-holding individual in the singular,
and "humanity" to a mere multiple of this singularity, CBA renders itself incapable of accounting for or nurturing human freedom. What is more, CBA's methods and presuppositions represent
more than just a set of semi-arbitrary scientific stipulations-more
than just a disposable yardstick, so to speak. Given its overtly political context and application, CBA also constitutes a powerful
and widely-held ideology of human nature, one which pre-orients
how we go about (and should go about, if we are "rational") forming preferences and making choices.
Of course, the word "ideology" does not define itself. In order
to underscore what is at stake in our reflections on CBA, and for
the sake of clarity, this essay will therefore appropriate Karl
Mannheim's classic definition of the term:
The concept "ideology" reflects the one discovery which
emerged from political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can
in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a
situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain
facts which would undermine their sense of domination.
There is implicit in the word "ideology" the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others
and thereby stabilizes it.213
Our previous analyses of the phenomenon of senseless kindness,
and of the Greek concept of politics, have already brought to light
what CBA cannot (or will not) see about the nature of human
preference-formation.
In a nutshell: CBA's methods, geared
entirely to generating technocratic solutions to the problem of this
or that political "project," steer thought away from the truths of

211.
212.
213.
trans.,

ARENDT, supra note 89, at 19-21.
Id. at viii.
KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 40 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils
Harvest Books 1936).
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human freedom and desire.
These truths lie in the social
dimension of preferences-in the fact that preferences' actual
existence shows itself as a ceaseless becoming in the context of
being with others. The time has now come to point out the
distinctly political dimension, in the modern sense of the word
"political," of what CBA does not allow its followers and supporters
to see.
VIII. The Politics of CBA
Even a preference against politics is a kind of politics in the
sense that it is a value to which its supporters cling and for which
they are prepared to struggle. To illustrate the importance of this
point, we will analyze the iconic "world without transaction costs"
that Coase constructs (and CBA constantly cites) to show why
there is a divergence in the real world between private and social
costs. 214 The main point of Coase's project is to demonstrate that
transaction costs actually are incredibly important barriers to efficiency in the real world, 215 and his genius was to do this by imagining a world in which no pesky transaction costs ever intervene
between preferences and their efficient instantiation.
This
thought experiment shows that in an environment that is stipulated to have zero transaction costs, goods will inevitably wind up
in the hands of those who value them most, and that this will
happen regardless of how and to whom the law initially distributes the goods in question. 216 Although it has been shown that
Coase's conclusions do not hold in cases where a person's WTA for
a good that he owns exceeds his WTP for that good if he had to
purchase it from another (the "offer-asking problem"), 217 the uses
to which Coase and others have put his imaginary world are important enough to have earned him a Nobel Prize in economics in
1991.218

Brilliant and path-breaking as it is, Coase's thought experiment also proves something that is not listed on his prize citation: 219 namely, the observation that in an environment in which
214. Coase, supra note 198 passim.
215. RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174-79 (1988).

216. Id.
217. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 168, at 145-48.
218. See Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991, http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/economics
/laureates/1991/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
219. Id. (announcing Coase's award "for his discovery and clarification of the
significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure
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there are literally no transaction costs, people's preferences never
change. 220 This conclusion follows from the simple fact that no
"costly" interactions with other beings could ever rise up to affect
them. 22 1 A preference in Coase's world 222 is like an unimpeded
body moving in a perfect vacuum: it goes on forever. "All things
come to be through strife," says Heraclitus, 223 reminding us that
change always comes at a "cost," if only the cost of learning to appreciate or desire something new. Without the prospect of change,
the people in Coase's world lack the capacity to initiate anything
new. Lacking spontaneity, they also lack freedom. Knowing everything there is to be known, and requiring no costly human contact to realize their preferences, the denizens of Coase's world are
like Leibniz's perfect monads, which "have no windows, by which
anything could come in or go out."224 In brief, a world without
transaction costs is a world without politics: the very idea of it
represents a sort of apolitical heaven for the practitioners of CBA.
As I remarked earlier, CBA has inherited a general philosophical mistrust or contempt for politics that can be traced to
Plato. 225 Indeed, there are many striking parallels between the
theory of CBA and Plato's metaphysical and political ideas. The
eternal ideas that Plato put above the changeable world of appearances correspond to CBA's "preferences," which stand frozen
in suspended animation at any given point in time.226 Just as
Plato thought that the eternal ideas can be perceived by the philosopher in an act of pure beholding, 227 so too CBA imagines that
the ongoing metamorphosis of preferences in social life can somehow be arrested and measured by a technician who need not take

and functioning of the economy").
220. COASE, supra note 215, at 175.
221. Id.
222. Coase himself rejects this terminology and has written that far from being
"his" world, the imaginary world without transaction costs "is the world of modern
economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave." Id. at
174. This does not imply, however, that Coase interprets transaction costs as benign, for he sees them much as other economists do-namely, as "barriers" to efficient transactions.
223. HERACLITUS, supra note 6, at 49.
224. GOTTFRIED

WILHELM

LEIBNIZ,

The

Monadology,

in

PHILOSOPHICAL

WRITINGS 3, 3 (Mary Morris trans., 1934).
225. See supratext accompanying notes 167-70.
226. Coase, supranote 198, at 176-78.
227. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note

22, at 575, 747-72 (discussing the allegory of the cave and the theory that knowledge consists in the pure seeing of eternal Ideas).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 25:147

account of the vulgar phenomenon of their becoming-in-time. 228
And as Plato's timeless ideas hold sway over what merely seems to
be good, 229 CBA's objective preferences at any given time likewise
hold sway over what they are constantly becoming as a consequence of social interaction. Plato believed that the truth of the
ideas, as interpreted by the philosopher-king, should inform politics. 2 30 CBA recasts this theory into one in which the truth of opinions, as interpreted by the social scientist, should inform politics. 28 ' The truth of Plato's ideas and the truth of CBA's opinions
both fulfill the role of an origin and measure-what the Greeks
called an arch-for political action. 232 In each case the archi is
imposed on the changing circumstances and unstable affairs of
acting human beings and establishes what Arendt calls a kind of
"tyranny of truth."233 Experiences like senseless kindness, which
do not fit into the framework of either truth-as-idea or truth-asstable-opinion, are excluded as irrelevant by the authoritative interpreter of truth. In Plato's case this person is the philosopherking; in CBA's case it is the social scientist. The homology is almost perfect.
The idea that truth can be tyrannical is one of the most important insights of postmodern social theory. It is a major corollary of a thesis of philosophical anthropology that maintains that
human beings are essentially hermeneutical creatures. 234 On the
negative side, to be hermeneutical means never being able to know
the world "directly," in an unmediated burst of immaculate conceiving. 235 On the positive side, it means that we always receive
the world in a completely mediated way-that we interpret 236 it by
228. Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
NIETZSCHE 369, 395-96 (Helen Zimmern trans., 1927) (noting that "the Platonic
mode of thought, which was an aristocratic mode, consisted precisely in resistance
to obvious sense-evidence," and which took the form of "pale, cold, grey conceptual
networks which they threw over the motley whirl of the senses-the mob of the
senses, as Plato said").
229. PLATO, supra note 227, at 759 (defining pure knowledge as "the knowledge
of that which always is, and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away").
230. Id. at 752-58.
231. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 6-7 (discussing how opinions influence political choices under CBA).
232. See MICHAEL INWOOD, A HEIDEGGER DICTIONARY 83 (1999).
233. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 47.
234. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 254-71 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., 2d ed. Crossroad Publ'g Corp. 1989) (1960).
235. Id. at 265-71.
236. The dictionary defines "hermeneutic" as "the study of the methodological
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means of what Heidegger calls our fore-conceptions (Vorgriffen),
fore-having (Vorhabe), and fore-sight (Vorsicht).237 Without going
too far afield into the intricacies of Heideggerian thought, suffice it
to say that these concepts basically signify that whenever we encounter something as such-that is, explicitly as a "tree," as a
"preference," or as whatever-the thing in question is already involved with us, in advance, in terms of our pre-understandings of
the world and what is significant about it.238 Sociologists call this
phenomenon the "social construction of reality."239 And the great
sociologist Mannheim shows how it pertains to our concepts of
knowledge and truth: "[T]he notion of knowledge in general is dependent upon the concretely prevailing form of knowledge and the
modes of knowing expressed therein and accepted as ideal, [and]
the concept of truth itself is dependent upon the already existing
types of knowledge." 240 Given this framework for thinking about
knowledge, truth becomes tyrannical whenever people forget their
own socially contingent relation to the forms of knowledge they
employ and begin to insist, often forcibly, that their own point of
view is what Catharine MacKinnon calls the standard for point-of24I
viewlessness.
To illustrate the idea of the tyranny of truth, consider the following rather chilling hypothetical example, drawn from the philosophical writings of Herbert Marcuse:
A man who travels by automobile to a distant place chooses
his route from the highway maps. Towns, lakes and mountains appear as obstacles to be bypassed. The countryside is
shaped and organized by the highway: what one finds en route
is a byproduct or annex of the highway. Numerous signs and
posters tell the traveler what to do and think; they even request his attention to the beauties of nature or the hallmarks
of history. Others have done the thinking for him, and perhaps for the better. Convenient parking spaces have been
constructed where the broadest and most surprising view is
open. Giant advertisements tell him when to stop and find the
principles of interpretation." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 566
(1991). Although the word's signification in philosophical thought is much broader
than this, the definition helpfully maintains the all-important connection between
"hermeneutic" and the idea that human beings interprettheir world.
237. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 150 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., Harper 1962) (1927).
238. Id. at 190-91.
239. See generally PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
240. MANNHEIM, supranote 213, at 292.
241. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and State, 8 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 635, 638-39 (1983).
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pause that refreshes. And all of this is indeed for his benefit,
safety and comfort; he receives what he wants. Business,
technics, human needs and nature are welded together into
one rational and expedient mechanism. He will fare best who
follows its directions, subordinating his spontaneity242to the
anonymous wisdom which ordered everything for him.
I call this example chilling because it so accurately reflects what
sheep we have become. Its all too familiar particularities indicate,
in a more general way, what actually goes on day in and day out in
societies whose members have surrendered themselves completely
to the imperatives of efficiency and instrumental rationality. Not
only is the man's behavior in Marcuse's example perfectly
"rational" in a technological sense, but the dissolution of all
rationality into semi-spontaneous reactions to prescribed
mechanical norms means that, from the standpoint of
instrumental thinking, only a crank would insist on making
journeys in some other, less efficient way. The cold, wet blanket of
conformity to the "correct" thing to do makes any dissent that
dares question its correctness from the standpoint of its ultimate
meaning look like a symptom of mental illness, rather than the
expression of an alternative vision of what being rational means.
But the "obvious" ex ante efficiency of the journey the man takes
comes at a cost: namely, the chance that a less efficient route that
meanders through villages and past farms might actually be more
rewarding to him-indeed, that it might change what he prefers,
or even who he is, by virtue of the marginal increase in interhuman contact that it would require of him.
CBA is like the interstate highway system: no stoplights and
no detours. By making human beings into the pawns of their own
previous preferences, CBA treats them as passive agents on the
highway. A passive agent is someone who is required to execute
what does not necessarily reflect her own desires, as in the case of
a legal agent's duty to implement her principal's lawful instructions, whatever they may be. CBA treats preference holders as
passive agents because it conceives of them as having to stand by
their previously measured WTPs and WTAs regardless of what
happens, or might happen, after the measurement (unless, of
course, another measurement is subsequently commissioned and
performed). At one level this is understandable, for as Arendt correctly observes, modes of behavior can become objects of systematic research "only if one excludes man as an active agent, the au242. HERBERT MARCUSE, TECHNOLOGY, WAR AND FASCISM 46 (Douglas Kellner
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thor of demonstrable events in the world, and demotes him to a
creature who merely behaves differently in different situations, on
whom one can conduct experiments, and who, one may even hope,
can ultimately be brought under control."243 Abstracting from the
life-world in this way, CBA seeks to control or influence decision
making by means of a theoretical move, the one-time measurement of WTPs and WTAs, that seems to encode people's wellformed desires, but that in fact leaves no institutional space for
them to freely mold and remold their preferences in the course of
political discussion.
The ideology that CBA is an objective, scientific assessment
of people's preferences-as in the disarming hypothetical claim,
"But I'm only trying to find out what people are willing to pay
for!"-diminishes people's ability to recognize that, as things stand
now (in the United States, at least), they utterly lack the institutional space for politics in Arendt's sense of the term. In its effects, it would not be inappropriate to compare CBA to those totalitarian modes of administration that impose solutions from
above while advertising that they are merely doing the will of the
people. 244 If Arendt is right that the ultimate meaning of politics
is freedom, then the meaning of CBA is the kind of politics that
seeks to control or steer freedom into servitude to "data" about
what "the people" on balance prefer about the political projects
that will affect their lives. But as Fuller says, "the greatness of
what we call democratic government does not lie in the mere fact
that a numerical majority controls at election time, but at a point
further removed from the ballot box, in the forces which are permitted to play upon the electorate." 245 In other words, the real
measure of a given society's level of democracy does not consist in
the fact that individual preference holders have a one-off chance to
say what they prefer from a slate of choices they had no role in
shaping. Rather, the level of democracy in a society depends on
whether its public and private institutions make communicative
rationality in the political sphere easier or harder, more open or
less open, more valued or less valued.
From a purely historical point of view, one could say that
CBA's methods attempt to abolish what Weber calls "the knowl-

243. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 105.
HALBERSTAM,
244. See MICHALE

TOTALITARIANISM

AND

THE

MODERN

CONCEPTION OF POLITICS 20-21 (1999) (discussing totalitarianism's effect on individual thought).
245. LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 123 (1940).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 25:147

edge of the tragedy with which all action, but especially political
action, is truly interwoven." 246 CBA does this by the simple expedient of ignoring or denying time's relentless destabilization of
everything solid, including especially human opinions and desires.
Of course, the law also attempts to abolish tragedy in this way:
the enforcement of a legally binding contract despite the fact that
one of the parties regrets having made it is a leading case in point.
Defenders of the institution of contract sometimes legitimate this
result by claiming that the law "must respect our capacity as free
and rational persons to choose our own good, and that respect
means allowing persons to take responsibility for the good they
choose." 247 In effect, CBA follows the law's lead by implicitly construing human preferences as if they were contractually binding
promises that could not later be changed without incurring legal
and perhaps moral responsibility. In contract law, what happens
after a binding promise is made-including especially any regrets
and changes in the preferences that led to the promise in the first
place-are generally held to be immaterial as a consequence of the
old Latin maxim and legal principle pacta sunt servanda ("promises must be kept"). 248 But the metaphor of promises exchanged in
a market transaction is clearly inapt, because none of the WTPs
and WTAs that CBA measures are legally binding. They are in
principle, and in fact, socially conditioned works in progress. To
put it another way: in the world of politics, unlike that of contracts, people are always free to change their minds in response to
new information and new experiences with others.
In default of any sustained political discussion and interaction among those who will be affected by a given project, CBA's
calculations lay down ends which CBA then offers to state officials
to enact through law. The way CBA describes the nature of its relationship to decision makers-"to provide useful information to
24 9
the decision maker, and not to furnish the decision itself' shows that it sees the state as the monolithic proprietor of force,
rather than seeing public force as the possible consequence of
freedom in the political realm. This way of thinking about political power is far too crude. To borrow an important distinction
drawn by Arendt, the ends that the state pursues through the ap-

246. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY,
supra note 23, at 77, 117.
247. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 20 (1981).

248. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 1140.
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plication or threat of legal force are not the same as the goals of
politics. 250 The latter "are never anything more than the guidelines and directives by which we orient ourselves and which, as
such, are never cast in stone, but whose concrete realizations are
constantly changing because we are dealing with other people who
have goals." 251 Her extended discussion of the meaning of the distinction between ends and goals brings home what is at stake in
our reflections about the ideological aspects of CBA:
Only when brute force with its arsenal of means is introduced
into the space between people-where until that point nothing
has passed back and forth except speech, which is devoid of
tangible means--do the goals of politics become ends.... If a
political action that does not stand under the sign of brute
force does not achieve its goals . . that does not render the political action either pointless or meaningless. It cannot be
pointless because it never pursued a "point," that is, an end,
but has only been directed at goals, more or less successfully;
and it is not meaningless because in the back-and-forth of exchanged speech-between individuals and peoples, between
states and nations-that space in which everything else that
takes place is first created and sustained. What in political
language is called a "breakdown in relations" is the abandonment of that in-between space, which all violent action first
destroys before it proceeds to annihilate those who live outside
of it.252

As harsh as it may sound to say it, the institution of CBA is
the harbinger of a fundamental breakdown in political relations in
Arendt's sense. It is the tip of the spear of state force, administered through law, which can use CBA's findings to legitimate
whatever projects the numbers happen to favor. But as it seeks to
guarantee the ends (political projects) with the means (a static determination of individual preferences), CBA ignores or fails to notice the fact that its means do not correspond to human life as it is
lived in history. To repeat one last time: real human preferences
are never essentially private; individual intentions, interests and
desires are tied to language and culture, and thus are inescapably
social and susceptible to change. Pretending merely to describe
individual preferences, CBA actually constructs them as they
would be if people never interacted with one another. That the resulting "information" can be used and exploited politically is obvious. That it can seem democratic, inasmuch as it scrupulously
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counts everyone's "dollar votes" without seeming to impose a solution from the outside, is equally obvious. 253 What is less obvious,
but nonetheless true, is that the objective information that CBA
provides to policymakers is cloaked in a very subjective and politically charged point of view on the true nature of human preferences.
Conclusion
If this essay has accomplished its purpose, it should be obvious by now that no conceivable improvement in the theory of CBA
could ever bring it closer to the facts of the matter, for the politics
of CBA as a method for gathering and evaluating what it calls
"facts" is what has been most at stake in my meditations. CBA
enacts a particular vision of what preference formation and decision making in economically advanced democratic societies can,
and should, be. In its determination to freeze the evolution of
preferences in the life-world into forms that can be counted and
compared, CBA reflects both the hyper-technological world in
which it appears and the atrophied political culture that it informs. This is hardly surprising, for history teaches us that an age
usually gets the political institutions that it deserves. If bureaucratically managed decision making on the basis of numerated individual preferences that are modeled as being immune to change
is what is wanted, then CBA is just the ticket. Indeed, since
American society currently lacks the kind of vibrant public institutions that would allow for a fully adequate public discussion of political goals, perhaps CBA, like the ballot box and the opinion poll,
is the best chance policymakers have for discerning the public
"mood." On the other hand, if genuine democracy means more
than the counting of dollar votes cast at a discrete and politically
binding point in time-if it implies popular engagement in decision making processes that never guarantee the result in advance,
but always leave room for something new and unforeseen to
emerge from the messy dynamics of human interaction-then it
seems to me that CBA is part of the problem rather than a contribution to the solution. For there is nothing more dangerous to any
robust conception of popular democracy than the belief that the
determination of "what the people want" is safely in the hands of
experts.
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